Dependences

Peirce – Hjelmslev – Ingarden

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Husserlian dependences – central to semiotics-linguistics-ontology

- A central text regarding dependences in modern thought is Husserl's 3rd *Logical Investigation* (1900) – on Parts and Moments
- *Genuine parts* are parts of a whole which may be separated from that whole and are thus independent
- *Moments* are parts of a whole which may not be so separated and are thus dependent



A new theory of the A Priori

This makes possible three elementary dependence relations: *unilateral dependence, mutual dependence, independence*

To Husserl, this made possible a new, non-subjective theory of the a priori relations in formal as well as regional ontologies: they consist of objective dependences

He went on, immediately, to make an a priori grammar in the 4th investigation, a theory of intention in the 5th, an epistemology in the 6th … (-> Jakobson – markedness/unmarkedness)

”Rediscovery” of this theory by the ”Manchester gang of three” – Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, since the 1980s -

Peirce – Hjelmslev – Ingarden

- The three have different roles as to Husserl's doctrine –
- Peirce – anticipating it independently
- Hjelmslev – replicating it, probably independently
- Ingarding – inheriting it, explicitly
- All three, however, develop further and complicate the simple Husserlian three-dependence scheme in different ways



Peirce

- Peirce famously develops his three-category metaphysics by generalizing the logical *structure* of propositions (predicate-subject-copula)
- *Quality–Relation–Representation,* or *First–Second-Thirdness*
- These categories are interrelated by Peirce's three kinds of distinctions, *dissociation, prescission,* and *discrimination*
- Dissociation may distinguish independent entities (like red from blue); prescission may distinguish an independent from a dependent entity (like space from color), discrimination may distinguish also dependent entities (like color from space)

- 1. <--/--> 2. 2. <--/--> 3.
- The categories may not be dissociated.
- 1. <---- 2. 1. --/--> 2.
- 2. <---- 3. 2. --/--> 3.
- 1. <---- 3. 1. --/--> 3.
- A lower category may be prescinded from a higher, not vice versa.
- 1. <---- 2. 1. ----> 2.
- 2. <---- 3. 2. ----> 3.
- 1. <---- 3. 1. ----> 3.
- All categories may be discriminated from the others.
- So, 1) dissociation distinguishes independent parts,
  2) prescission distinguishes a founding part from a founded part, while
  3) discrimination distinguishes all that can be represented in isolation, such as founded parts, be they in unilateral or mutual dependencies

—to rephrase Peirce's distinction types in Husserlian foundation lingo.

Peirce complicating his dependence calculus

- The three categories may be subject to *degeneracy*
- The highest category (Thirdness) may be subject to *two* degrees of degeneracy (ex. a first order degenerate of a Symbol is an Index, a second order degenerate of a Symbol is an Icon)
- The next category (Secondness) may be subject to *one* degree of degeneracy (ex. the degenerate of a Deduction is a Corollary, of an Index: a Reagent)
- The lowest category (Firstness) cannot have a degenerate version
- So, a refined six-category table could be given as 1.0, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 3.1, 3.3 - all of them ultimately defined by dependence relations
- They become important for Peirce's final theoretical boom of the 1900s – now, signs have two different objects and three different meanings …

Hjelmslev's dependence calculus

- Prolegomena (1943): *determination, interdependence,* and *constellation* – basically identical to Husserl's 1900 proposal
- The *Resumé* (1941/75) famously considerably complicates this, making of the three Husserlian notions only the logical surface of a "participatory", sublogical depth, in which each oppositional concept zone may be occupied with different emphases:
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

Participation

- Participation – from Lévy-Bruhl – is here analysed as the possibility of the same content covering several, overlapping parts of the concept zone
- ”Rich” as in ”He’s rich” covers *one end* of the concept zone of wealth, while ”rich” as in ”How rich is he?” covers *the whole* of that zone (the opposition between the two Alphas, rich and poor)
- This is the extreme end of participation: "Participants have the highest possible number of common Variants” – participation thus comes in degrees
- The seven different ”ballots” now may be combined to give semantic systems of any numbers – cf the example with case structures

- Logical reduction of ”sublogical” participation:



- In the glossematic procedure analysis, you are assumed to begin with an un-analyzed text, and then proceed in stepwise description where the inventory of each level is analyzed in the three simple, logical ”Husserlian” dependences
- This seems to be pertinent, however, only for a ”middle-range” of linguistic forms, not or only partially applying at transphrastic super-sentence level, and not or only partially applying at the lowest level of ”figurae”, of composing morphemes
- So, participation reigns supreme both above and below sentence level where logic gains a delimited, insulated foothold:
- Macroscopic, transphrastic level – participation
- Mesoscopic, phrastic level – logical reduction of participation
- Microscopic, subphrastic level - participation
- Simultaneously, even at the mesoscopic sentence level, phenomena of syncretism, overlapping, gradualism, etc. may bear witness to participation at work

Ingarden

- As Husserl's realist pupil revolting against the "transcendental" turn of phenomenology in the 1910s, Ingarden retains the elementary Husserlian dependency triad
- He complicates it, however, in yet another way, namely by applying the triad to different ontological issues. In the "Existential Ontologie" in the first vol. of his *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*– his mapping of all types of beings which may exist in any possible world – he thus distinguishes:
- 1) *autonomy vs. heteronomy;* 2) *originality vs. derivation;*3) *separateness vs. inseparateness;* 4) *self-dependence vs. contingency*

- 1) *Autonomie vs. Heteronomie*—which is an entity having its whole foundation of being within itself, vs. an entity being dependent for its existence and its entire repertoire of qualities on another entity.
- (like existing objects (Frans Gregersen) vs. purely intentional and fictive objects (Donald Duck))
- 2) *Ursprünglichkeit vs. Abgeleitetheit*—which is the inability of an entity to be created or destroyed by another entity, vs. the dependence of an entity on another in order to come into existence
- (like ideal objects (God, math) vs. empirical objects (us in this room)

- 3) *Selbständigkeit vs. Unselbständigkeit*—which is the lack of requirement, in an entity, to form a whole with other entities in order to be existent, vs. the dependency of an entity that can only exist if it coexists with something else within the confines of a single whole;
- (like objects and processes vs. properties and events – closest to Husserl's parts vs. moments)
- 4) *Unabhängigkeit vs. Abhängigkeit*—which is when an entity is not only *selbständig* but also does not require the existence of any other *selbständige* objects, vs. the dependency of an entity on another in order to remain in existence.
- (like monadic predicates (red) vs. polyadic predicates (father, dependent on the existence of a son)

An ontological zoo

- To Ingarden, each of these four different dependence relations allow for independence, dependence and mutual independence
- All of the four are mutually independent and may be combine to give different types of possible objects
- They may even combine with further ontological distinctions such as different temporal existence types to yield 15 different ontological realms of beings, sorted in eight groups, from God or the Universe and to fictive properties
- Some overall species in this combination result may summed up to exist:
- (A) Absolutely (and thus be absolute entities), (B) Extratemporally (or ideally, and thus be ideal entities), (C) Temporally (or really, and thus be real entities), (D) Purely Intentionally (and thus be fictional entities)

Realms of Being after Ingarden



Existential Moments

- Autonomy / Heteronomy
- Originality / Derivation
- Separateness / Inseparateness
- Self-Dependence / Contingency
- Actuality / Post-Actuality
- Empirical Possibility / Non-Actuality
- Fissuration / Non-Fissuration
- Persistence / Fragility

Circled numbers refer to §31 of Ingarden's *Streit*. (Time and Modes of Being Chapter V.)

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Different destinies of H3

- So, Peirce uses H3 to define his basic 3-category structure, developing it further to 6 with three ”weakened” categories (actually, involving certain participation effects)
- Hjelmslev, in the opposite direction, takes H3 to be a logicalized surface emerging out of a vast combinatory of ”sublogical” categories
- Ingarden semantically specifies H3 into four combinable subtypes with independent validity
- All three of them, however, place dependences at the very foundation of their theories, independent of their different judgment of the character of that foundation – Peirce, metaphysics; Hjelmslev, generalized linguistics; Ingarden, ontology

A vain hope …

Many years ago, I noticed this proliferation of ambitious dependence calculi in ambitious philosophical and linguistic theories of the early 20 C –

- I thought that one fine day, I would get around to synthezise all of them in an even more ambitious calculus, and when Lorenzo and Frans came around with the *StructuralismS* project, I though: Now's the time!
- I must admit, however, that I have not been so able. In that sense, this paper is a failure. Maybe some other, finer day, I shall glimpse the adequate idea for unification – the Grand Unified Theory of Dependences
- Or, maybe never … in that case I remain hopeful that some future investigator will pick up this paper and go further than I was able …