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**P U B**

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# LINGUISTIC POLYPHONY

## About polyphony in language and literature

Polyphony has become a central concern of linguistics. For the last 20 years, this term has been mentioned more and more often in text, discourse and language studies, e.g. literary analysis, discourse analysis, communication studies, and linguistics. No doubt the term *polyphony* owes its popularity to the flexibility of the concept it refers to. The term appeals to an immediate intuition: you have the impression that polyphony corresponds to some reality. However, as soon as you try to explicate its status you realize that this job is far from simple.

This volume of *PréPub* presents a selection of some of the contributions from the seminar *Linguistic Polyphony* which was designed for students at MA-level. The seminar took place in the Spring semester 2011.

The aim of the seminar was to study linguistic polyphony, which deals with the purely linguistic contribution to the polyphonic interpretation of texts, and to introduce to the *ScaPoLine* (the Scandinavian Theory of Linguistic Polyphony). This theory deals with different linguistic, textual and discourse phenomena, like reported speech, connectors (connectives), linguistic argumentation, interpretation of literary texts.

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## **"I hear voices in everything".**

### **Bakhtin's concept of voice, linguistic polyphony and doublevoiced discourse.**

Nina Møller Andersen

I have given this essay the subtitle: "Bakhtin's concept of voice, linguistic polyphony and double voiced discourse", but it would be more fair to say that it is my interpretations of Bakhtin's concept of voice, linguistic polyphony and double-voiced discourse that I will present here. I have been doing research in Bakhtin's works for more than 30 years and have also translated some of Bakhtin's works from Russian to Danish; there are many interpretations of Bakhtin, mine is just one of them; my warrant is that I read him in the original language, Russian, and have been studying his theories for many years; I do not know if that makes my interpretation better than others, but this interpretation has been useful to me as a tool in analyzing both written and spoken 'texts' (text in the Bakhtinian sense of the word).

First I will make a short introduction to Bakhtin's major works to have a frame to refer to corresponding to my interpretation of voice and polyphony, and before returning to Bakhtin, voice and polyphony, I will shortly touch upon concepts of voice in linguistics in general, as linguistics are my frame/topic here; then I will deal with polyphony according to Bakhtin, look into Bakhtin's double-voiced discourse, which I call linguistic polyphony, and finally apply my interpretations on authentic spoken material, that is give examples and demonstrations of linguistic polyphony, in some respects also called 'voices'.

#### **Major works and theories**

Bakhtin is mostly known for his theories about literature, but many also connect him with philosophy, in particular phenomenology, where the major work is *Toward a Philosophy of*

*the Act* (1920/1993), and aesthetics/cultural theory with the major work *Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity* (1920-24/1990). Within literary criticism Bakhtin is the creator of the theory of polyphony where the major work is *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (1929/74), and the creator of the theory of carnival where the major work is *Rabelais and his World* (1965/68), which was also his doctoral thesis. He is also well known for his theory of the novel, where the major work is *Discourse in the novel* (1934-35/2003), and his genre theory, where the major work is *Speech Genres* (1952-53/86). The latter two works are not only major works within Bakhtin's novel- and genre theories, these theories are spread over his works as such, they are also major works within his discourse theory, and *Speech Genres* is actually more connected to linguistics than to literature. Few connect Bakhtin to linguistics and a linguistic oriented discourse theory, but actually all of Bakhtin's works have traces of language and discourse theory, in all his works he takes a point of departure in language, and the most linguistic of his works is *Speech Genres*. As for the topic of this paper, voices and polyphony from a linguistic point of view, the major works and parts of works are *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (especially chapter 5 about discourse in Dostoevsky) and *Discourse in the novel*. I have made an list of Bakhtin's major theories and to each of them attached his major work to this theory:

- **Theory of polyphony:** *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (1929/1974)
- **Theory of the novel:** *Discourse in the Novel* (1934-35/2003)
- **Theory of the carnival:** *Rabelais and his World* (1965/1968)
- **Phenomenology:** *Toward a Philosophy of the Act* (1920/1993)
- **Aesthetics/cultural theory:** *Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity* (1920-24/1990)
- **Language and discourse theory:** all his works, but especially: *Speech Genres* (1952-53/1986)
- **Genre theory:** Bakhtin 1986, 1974, 2003

The concept of voice is many-headed, has many names, and is therefore difficult to use and apply. Or rather one should say that this concept has grown a bit watered-down or misused (see example of this below).

No wonder the concept of voice has become too broadly interpreted, Bakhtin himself is not too accurate when he talks about voices: "But I hear voices in everything and the dialogic relations among them." ("Methodology for the Human Sciences" In *Speech Genres*, 1986).

This way of writing is typical for Bakhtin. It is an eye-catcher or ear-catcher, good to use in headlines and titles, but what does it really mean? It is very open for interpretation, and Bakhtin's writings are open for interpretation. There are many reasons or sources for his way of writing. Variation was a virtue for Bakhtin and his time. Because of the censorship during Stalin's regime, it could also be a good idea to write ambiguously. An example of this is Bakhtin's introduction to his genre work, *Speech Genres*, where he quotes (without using quoting marks) Stalin's work on linguistics ("Marxisme og sprogvidenskabens problemer" Moskva 1950, s 18-19), which helped this work through the censorship.

### Linguists on voice (and Bakhtin)

Before turning to Bakhtin's concept of voice and polyphony, I will touch upon some concepts of voice within linguistics (with some kind of reference to Bakhtin) – I have chosen a few, serious ones that I find relevant.

Within dialogic discourse theory Per Linell, a well known Swedish linguist, writes about voices:

"(...) we reconstruct our various cultural traditions – linguistic, ideological, conceptual – through our language use. However, in a given speaker's utterance, there are usually reflections and reconstructions of other, specific individuals' or groups' 'voices'. (...) More generally, the identification of different identities in the same speaker parallels the acknowledgement of different 'personae' in the self (...). **Most emphatically, perhaps, the issues of multi-voicedness (or polyphony) have been explored by Bakhtin; in his views, individuals' utterances host many voices, several identities, some of which may be personal, while many are 'social languages'** (...) associated with activity types, professions, roles and genres." (Per Linell 1998: *Approaching dialogue. Talk, interaction and contexts in dialogical perspectives*, p 108, my underlining).

Linell is one of those who are closest to Bakhtin's idea of voice. The underlined part is a very accurate and useful description of Bakhtin's idea of heteroglossia (social languages). By 'social languages' Linell is actually referring to heteroglossia, but I think he is mixing this with polyphony (I will return to that).

Within didactics and class room research Olga Dysthe, a Norwegian sociolinguist, is using Bakhtin's concept of voice in many of her works. In her most well known book: *Det flerstemmige klasserum* (The polyphonic class room)) she writes:

"I have chosen to use 'manyvoicedness' about the many potential voices in the class room (...). When a group of pupils are having a conversation in the class room, a multitude of voices is created, combined with the voice of the teacher, the text book and maybe others' texts." (my translation)

("Jeg har valgt at bruge flerstemmighed om de mange potentielle stemmer i et klasserum (...). Når en flok elever samtaler i klasserummet, skabes en mangfoldighed af stemmer, kombineret med lærerens stemme, lærebogens og eventuelt andres teksters." (Dysthe 1997, s 71))

Olga Dysthe is one of the linguistic researchers who have used Bakhtin's idea of voices in a pedagogical sense. The citation shows a clear, but also very broad interpretation and use of 'voice'. It is not wrong, but it could be more differentiated.

Directly referring to Bakhtin Dysthe writes:

"An important element of Bakhtin's dialogism is that all our utterances are bearers of voices from former users, from cultural contexts where the words have been used before. Our words are in this way 'manyvoiced' in themselves, and besides they are parts of dialogues and create new 'manyvoiced' rooms." (my translation)

("Et vigtigt element av Bakhtins dialogisme er at alle våre ytringer er bærere av stemmer fra tidligere brukere, fra kulturelle kontekster der ordene har vært brukt før. Ordene våre er dermed flerstemmige i sig selv, og dessuten inngår de i dialoger og skaper nye flerstemmig rom." (Dysthe, 2000: 25).)

What we have here is again a very broad and pedagogical use of voice. It is without doubt useful for many, but I think it holds a not unusual misinterpretation (or maybe mixing of concepts) of Bakhtin. What Dysthe is giving us here is actually a very precise description of the foreign words influence in our word (and not polyphony).



The last linguistic view on Bakhtin's voice concept that I will draw attention to is James Wertsch's. Wertsch is an American (linguistic) anthropologist who in Bakhtin focuses especially on voice with inner thoughts and feelings, the bakhtinian concept of inner thought and the idea of mastery and appropriation, and voices creating meaning:

"[...] meaning can come into existence only when two or more voices come into contact:

when the voice of a listener responds to the voice of a speaker." (James Wertsch 1991: 51)

In this citation Wertsch sees meaning as constructed by two voices, he is talking about voices as belonging to one person, not two voices in one, not polyphony.

To sum up on other linguists' interpretation on Bakhtin's concept of voice (the ones mentioned are all serious, well founded interpretations, the less serious I have not taken into consideration), you can conclude that the field is so to speak broad. You can interpret this in a negative way: it is too broad (which means not so useful), or you can interpret this in a positive way: the bakhtinian concept of voice is an inspiration to use in many ways.

### **Bakhtin's concept of voice (and polyphony)**

I will now turn to Bakhtin's own concept of voice: also this concept is many-headed, and you can, from his works on voice and polyphony, state as follows:

- -voice is connected to Bakhtin's concept of polyphony
- -you have to be aware that polyphony is a literary concept
- -voice to Bakhtin means or represents ideologic position
- -voice is connected to slovo, the Russian word for word

To conclude on this: a differentiation is necessary!



To understand what voice means you have to include polyphony, as these two words or concepts are often, and unrightly so, treated as synonymes.

I will use this picture above to illustrate what Bakhtin's polyphony mainly is not. The picture is representing the musical use of polyphony; that is the original concept of polyphony. Bakhtin has also taken the concept from music, although Bakhtin's concept has nothing to do with music, in the literal sense of the word (polyphony to Bakhtin is, in short, a literary concept representing the idea of autor and hero being equal, none of them gets the last word). The picture above is a polyphonic movement/composition of Gregorian church singing/choir, from the Notre Dame school by Leonin (1135-1201) with two voices, the upper one is moving in free passages while the lower one is moving in slower long passages. I am using it here as an example of how not to use Bakhtin. I once heard an extremely interesting paper on Greek monastery choir music, where Bakhtin's concept of polyphony was used, and in my opinion it was too far out, but it was also interesting as an example of how Bakhtin's ideas are being used to almost anything. The point is that

polyphony in the bakhtinian sense has nothing to do with polyphony in the musical sense – it is not just the sound of two voices, it is an idea.

Bakhtin's concept of voice in my reading is as follows, (and I will substantiate it in the following):

- voice = Russian *golos*
- voice = slovo (word) ??
- heteroglossia:
  - rasnogolositsa (different voiced(ness))
  - rasnoretjije (different speech(ness))
  - rasnojasytjije (different language(ness))
- multi-voicedness (mangestemmighed)
- multi-voicedness (flerstemmighed)
- polyphony
- dvugolosoje slovo = double-voiced discourse

Directly translated the Russian word *golos* means voice and is used in the same way. Sometimes in Bakhtin's works the bakhtinian concept slovo (which is mostly, and rightly so, translated into the word discourse (in the English translations that is) – but slovo has several translations, and the translation into voice might be for stylistic reasons; I am not sure about this, therefore the question mark. I will return to the concept of heteroglossia, but here just mention that it is a translator's term (namely Michael Holquist's, a very famous Bakhtin scholar) covering three Russian (bakhtinian terms) – Bakhtin never used the word heteroglossia. It should also be noticed that in Russian and in Danish there are two words for multivoicedness, while only one in the English translation. Actually that is quite all right, for Bakhtin does not differentiate between these two expressions (he uses them mainly when not connected to persons in the novel), it seems to me that he uses them randomly, it seems that this is only part of his usual flair for variety in his writings. Polyphony and voice are often used synonymously, but in Bakhtin's work' polyphony is the key concept for a literary theory and voice is one of many concepts belonging to this theory. In my reading dvugolosoje slovo, that is double voiced discourse, is the most important concept in linguistic polyphony. I will return to all this below.

In the following I will substantiate my reading using quotes from the book on polyphony (Bakhtin 1984) that is within literary criticism, and the work on the word, *Discourse in the Novel* (Bakhtin 1952-53), that is discourse theory, and comment on these most important quotes of Bakhtin on voice.

In the book about polyphony and Dostoevsky, that is **literary criticism**, Bakhtin writes as follows about (polyphony and) voice:

- "The essence of polyphony lies precisely in the fact that the voices remain independent (...)" (Bakhtin 1984, p. 21)
- "Dostoevsky – to speak paradoxically – thought not in thoughts but in points of view, consciousnesses, voices." (ibid. p. 93)
- "(...)The image of the ideal human being (...) represents for him the resolution of ideological quests. This image or this highest voice must crown the world of voices, must organize and subdue it." (ibid. p. 97)

From this I can conclude that the overall idea of voice in the bakhtinian understanding always is related to polyphony (literature) and it is representing ideological position.

As for **discourse theory** Bakhtin writes in *Discourse in the Novel* about voices that:

- "(...). Ordet i sådan tale [fremmed tale] er et særligt tostemmigt ord. Det tjener på samme tid to talende subjekter og udtrykker samtidig to forskellige intentioner: den talende persons direkte intention og autors brudte intention. I sådan et ord findes der to stemmer, to meninger og to ekspressioner (...). Det tostemmige ord er altid indre dialogiseret. Sådan er det humoristiske, ironiske, parodiske ord (...). Der er indlagt en potentiel dialog i dem, en ikke udfoldet, kondenseret dialog mellem to stemmer, to verdensanskuelser, to sprog." (Bakhtin 2003 (manus), s 45)

In the chapter on the word/discourse (Russ.:slovo) Bakhtin writes about voices that:

- "(...) In one discourse, two semantic intentions appear, two voices. Parodying discourse is of this type, as are stylization and stylized *skaz*." (ibid p. 189)
- "The situation is different with parody. (...) The second voice, once having made its home in the other's discourse, clashes hostilely with its primordial host and forces him to serve directly opposing aims. Discourse becomes an arena of battle between voices." (ibid. p. 193)

From this I can conclude about voice, that is the ideological position, that it manifests itself in slovo (the word):

- with one voice: single-voiced discourse: "Alt er middel, dialog er målet. En stemme alene afslutter intet og afgør intet. To stemmer er livets minimum, eksistensens minimum." (Bachtin 1994, p. 473)
- with two voices: double-voiced discourse:
- "To stemmer er livets minimum, eksistensens minimum." (Bachtin 1994, p. 473)

It is now clear that, in the bakhtinian sense, the concept of voice is subordinate to polyphony; polyphony is basically a literary term, and we have to differ between the literary understanding of polyphony, where it means that there is a balance between autor and hero's authenticity – they have equal value, one does not overrule the other, and the linguistic understanding, where it is not called polyphony, but double-voiced discourse (dvugolosoje slovo); one could say that the idea of polyphony (ideological position) in language manifests itself in the word as double voiced discourse.

### **Linguistic polyphony = double voiced discourse**

Double voiced discourse, that is linguistic polyphony is being described by Bakhtin this way (the citations are from the manuscript of my own translation of the Dostojevsky book (Bachtin 1994) and *Discourse in the Novel: Ordet i romanen*, Gyldendal 2003):

"Alt er middel, dialog er målet. En stemme alene afslutter intet og afgør intet. To stemmer er livets minimum, eksistensens minimum." (Bachtin 1994, s. 473)

"Sådan er også det humoristiske, ironiske, parodiske ord (...) - alt dette er tostemmige, indre dialogiserede ord. Der er indlagt en potentiel dialog i dem, en ikke udfoldet, kondenseret dialog mellem to stemmer, to verdensanskuelser, to sprog." (Bachtin 2003)

Voice manifests itself in slovo (the word) and the interesting part here is the double-voiced discourse because here you can hear the voices (there is a distance, an activity and a direction) Bakhtin has in the Dostoevsky book made a shema of double-voiced discourse.

On the background of Bakhtin's understanding of the double voiced discourse and his famous schema of single and double voiced discourses in the Dostoevsky book (Bachtin 1994: p. 414-15) I have made a schema of 3 types of double-voiced discourse with relevance to language use (more about this see Møller Andersen below under literature):

- stylization: unidirectional →→
- parody/irony: vari-direct →←
- hidden dialogue: active t. ↔ ↓

The arrows are illustrating the direction of the voices; it can be illustrated in a general way what the three types are:

- stylization: e.g. *you stylize a youth vernacular (the two voices have the same direction)*
- parody/irony: e.g. *you make fun of the youth vernacular (the two voices go against each other)*
- hidden dialogue: e.g. *dialogue in a public room, e.g. a bus (you can in the voice hear another voice directed to someone else in the room)*

In stylization you stylize a youth ethnolect or rather vernacular - the two voices have the same direction (at the University of Copenhagen a lot of research is going on in this field, and the researchers do not agree upon what to call this kind of 'lect'; one call it ethnolect (others are very much against this), it is called modern urban youth style, and Ben Rampton (at University college of London) calls it urban vernacular. You can just call it youth style).

With parody/irony: the two voices go against each other; e.g. you make fun of the youth ethnolect.

In hidden dialogue you can in the voice hear another voice directed to someone else in the room (e.g. in the public room, in the bus, at the doctors) I will return to this with authentic examples later.

I can now make two interim conclusions about the bakhtinian concept of voice:

#### 1. conclusion:

- Voice means ideologic position
- Voice manifests itself in 'slovo' (the word)
- Dvugolosoje slovo (double-voiced discourse) is what has interest
- Other concepts of voice are not based on the individual and are therefore a different kind (that is: social languages) and not 'real voices'

## 2. conclusion:

- A differentiation of the voice-concept in two or three is necessary:
- 1. Literature/narrative theory: a voice represents an ideologic position/implicit author
- 2. Linguistics/discourse theory:
  - a. a voice (always representing an ideologic position) manifests itself in a slovo; the double-voiced slovo is the interesting one, because here you can 'hear' the voices
  - b. non-ideological/non-individual: heteroglossia, social languages ('lects')

On the basis of these two conclusions I can, before I turn to the authentic examples from spoken language, make a final conclusion on Bakhtin's concept of voice:

- Bakhtin's concept of voice as such is too vague
- It is the manifestations of voice that is interesting; that is: double-voiced discourse
- Double-voiced discourse can be applied in linguistic analysis of e.g. spoken language
- The concept heteroglossia is very useful, but should not be mixed with the concepts of voice and polyphony

### ***Authentic examples of double voiced discourse and heteroglossia***

I will now demonstrate how double voiced discourse, what is of interest because you can hear both voices, manifests itself in three types: stylization, parody/irony and hidden dialogue, and an example of heteroglossia, that is a social language, a 'lect'.

#### Stylization:

- maj: det var når [jeg var sammen med nogle- visse venner
- (det var sån-
- lin: ja
- (2.1)
- maj: som je.g faktisk gik sammen med ((fnis)) (2.0) nej øhm (.)
- ***ryger du så maja nej det gør jeg faktisk ikke det var til s- sånoget***
- s- jeg har (været) til spejder
- (0.8)
- lin: okay
- maj: i hulens mange år

- (Marianne Rahtje: Generationssprog i mundtlig interaktion. Ph.d.-afhandling, Københavns Universitet, 2008, s 176)

The example is taken from Marianne Rathje's ph.d.-thesis. Two girls are talking about episodes from their past. Maja is talking about an incident at a camp. She is mimicking herself (the underlined part), repeating in a stylized way what she said then. You can hear two voices here, the original from the past and the present, stylizing one. The two voices are going in the same direction, they are uni-directional, one is following the other stylizing it (One could discuss if she is making a parody of herself (that is the second type: parody), then her intonation had to be mocking).

Irony:

x: tager til Hawaii på tirsdag

com 1: *jeg kender absolut ingen der kunne blive misundelig J*

com 2: *jeg kender en: DIG:p Det er ved at blive lidt for koldt her i Californien, men så må man jo bare rejse videreJ Håber du har det godtJ*

(Troels Kjeldberg: bacheloropgave januar 2009, [www.facebook.com](http://www.facebook.com), 3. nov 2008)

This example is taken from a bachelor project (with permission). It is from facebook. In irony the two voices are going against each other. You can hear this in both com 1 and com 2. In com 1 the one voice is saying: I am jealous, the other voice is saying: I am not jealous – the two voices are clashing, going against each other. In com 2 (:*Det er ved at blive lidt for koldt her i Californien, men så må man jo bare rejse videre*) one voice is stating 'a fact', while the other is contradicting this fact, trying to make com 1 jealous – the two voices are clashing, going against each other, making the irony. (There are probably much more to be analysed in this small excerpt; *face book* is a good media to find examples of double voiced discourse!)



### *Hidden dialogue*



- Mother to child in the bus: *Put down your feet. We do not put our feet on the seat at home either!*
- (Mor til barn i bussen: *Tag fødderne ned fra sædet. Sådan gør vi ikke derhjemme!*)

In this hidden dialogue, the mother with one voice is addressing her child, and with the other (the hidden dialogue) is addressing the passengers in the bus, saying: I know how to bring up my child (or something like that). You can often hear this kind of double voiced discourse in the 'public room'; in busses, at the doctors at the supermarket.

### *Heteroglossia*

Heteroglossia is, as I have explained, in my view, not the same as voices. Heteroglossia is different kinds of social, professional and individual languages (Bakhtin counts for instance dialects to this concept). It is cronolects, sociolects, dialects; it is language variation

(politically it is the language that can room all kind of variations, as an opposition to the 'one and only' language, the language of power and authority, the system's language (see more about this in Møller Andersen, references below). A young person, for instance, when she is home in Århus, talks in one way with her mother, when she is back at university she talks with her fellow student in a different way, and when she is out at night with her girls friends she uses a third language (or she can mix all three in the same conversation) – that is heteroglossia, heteroglossia is also bankers language, farmers language etc. One of Bakhtins examples is: you talk in one way with god, in another with your farther.

- ALI: <nej shit mand>[<] Jackpot hele verden  
ESEN: Jackpot takes you there dadadadidu [synger]  
SELMA: hele verden  
EROL: are you finish  
ALI: Jackpot hele verden  
SELMA: <no I am Danish>[>]  
EROL: <no I am Danish>[<] *reklâmda*  
dan: no I am Danish *i reklamen*  
SELMA: *he*  
dan: *ja*  
ALI: no I am Finnish  
ESEN: <Morocco>[>]  
EROL: <Ingilizce>[<] hello  
dan: *engelsk* hello  
SELMA: hello I would like a squash  
ALI: hello I would like a squash # I am Danish
- (Køgeprojektet, with permission)

The example here is taken from a research program in the Danish 'folkeskole' (called Køgeprojektet). It is a group of pupils talking, while cutting out examples of advertising etc. from magazines. Ali and Errol are boys, Esen and Selma are girls. In this extract you can find examples of heteroglossia, where they mix 'glossias' (there is also code switching), it is youth style or etnolect. There is English commercial language, there is Danish, there are small Turkish expressions, and they switch between them, (actually you can also find

parody/irony in the example where Ali mocks at Ali who doesn't understand, and you can find stylization in Selmas repeating 'hele verden').

I have in this paper tried to put straight Bakhtin's concept of voice with all its sidelines, that is given my interpretation of Bakhtin's concept of voice and polyphony, and I have demonstrated the, in my reading, most interesting manifestation of voice and polyphony, the double voiced discourse. There are still much to be discussed in Bakhtins concepts, that applies to voice as well, for as Bakhtin writes:

"I hear voices in everything".

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## An exceptional polyphonic structure

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### Introduction

The connector *mais* and the negative *ne...pas* have been the subject of countless studies within the framework of various approaches (logical, syntactic, semantic...) and the two linguistic elements occupy a central place in polyphonic studies thanks to their aptitude for polysemous examination and the interest that lies in their combination. Since the pioneer work of Oswald Ducrot (1972), the connector *mais* has been considered as the pivot in concessive structures. In Ducrot *et al.* (1980), the authors propose a detailed analysis of the usages of *mais*, which reveal that this connector is likely to have an effect on the non-verbal, to the left as well as to the right. This analysis, which has become a classic, has been taken up again and formalized within the framework of the *ScaPoLine* (the Scandinavian theory of Linguistic Polyphony).

The vast literature that deals with the connector *mais* does, however, seem to have focused exclusively on its concessive usage. The same applies to the *ScaPoLine* analyses, which until now have not taken account of structures of the type *Pierre is not French but Danish*. The analyses proposed in the framework of this theory have merely mentioned this usage of *mais* as being different from that encountered in concessive structures without entering into an in-depth discussion of this 'different' usage. Yet, as long ago as 1977, Anscombe and Ducrot showed that it was necessary to distinguish a usage called adversative that exhibited properties significantly different from its concessive usage.

In this article I propose to make an analysis of the connector *mais* and of the negation *ne ... pas* as well as their interrelation in adversative structures so as to argue in favour of the relevance of a polyphonic analysis. It is not my purpose either to discuss or to give a comparative account of the different positions that have been taken up regarding the connector *mais*, as has been already been well-explored, for example, by van de Voorde

(1992). The purpose of this article will be, on the contrary, to bring out and develop the polyphonic aspects of the adversative construction, in particular by examining the interaction between *mais* and the negative *ne ... pas*, so as to highlight the contrast between a polyphonic analysis and the work that has been done previously on these two linguistic elements. The objective of the present analysis will be to explore and to clarify the nature of the elements involved in adversative constructions and to study the function of the negative *ne ... pas* as well as its interaction with the connector *mais* in these constructions. The present analysis will therefore be an attempt to understand and explicate what is distinctive, in both polyphonic and argumentative terms, in adversative structures that differ in several respects from concessive structures.

### 1. Distributional semantic analysis of the connector *mais*

Before beginning my analysis of adversative structures in line with the theoretical apparatus of the *ScaPoLine*, I am going to turn to the description of *mais* put forward by Anscombe & Ducrot (1977). Many analyses of the connector *mais* (cf. among others Plantin 1977, Blumenthal 1980, van de Voorde 1992) are based on this analysis that is now a classic, and it will serve also as my point of departure in the following discussion, although their description does not commit itself on the polyphonic nature of adversative structures.

The distributional semantic description that they put forward proposes two *mais* in French<sup>1</sup> whose morphology, however, remains identical. The initial idea of their analysis is the observation that the conjunction corresponding to *mais* is expressed by two different morphemes in Spanish and in German<sup>2</sup>. The connectors *pero* and *aber* function as argumentative connectors and link two utterances that which point to contrary conclusions, while *sino* and *sondern* serve to link two segments of discourse of which the latter corrects the former; they will therefore have an adversative meaning. French, in contrast, has to make do with a single morpheme *mais*,<sup>3</sup> which covers both semantic functions. As Anscombe & Ducrot remark, in French it is possible to distinguish the two *mais* by

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<sup>1</sup> Since the object of this study is to put forward an analysis of the adversative construction and not just a discussion of the connector *mais* and of its semantic usages, I make no comment on, among other things, Blumenthal's (1980) description, which fits into a syntax of the message and according to which there are three *mais* in French.

<sup>2</sup> Cf also Italian, which has several morphemes 'mais', namely *però*, *ma*, *anziche* and *(ma) bensì*, and Swedish, which has two: *utan* (equivalent to *sondern* and *sino*) and *men* (equivalent to *aber* and *pero*).

<sup>3</sup> Old French had a second morpheme *ainz* that coexisted with *mais* almost in the manner of the two morphemes in German and Spanish ; however *ainz* disappears about the 18<sup>th</sup> century as a result of a general weakening of its meaning and its usage is taken over by *mais*, which ever since has been the only morpheme in French.

replacement tests: whereas *maisPA*<sup>4</sup> may be substituted by *cependant*, *pourtant*, *néanmoins*, *en revanche* and *par contre*, *maisSN*<sup>5</sup> may be substituted by ‘:’, *au contraire*, *même que*. These lexical tests however are not sufficient to make a distinction as to how the connector functions. To determine criteria for distinguishing the two usages of *mais* in French, the description establishes a classification of the semantico-syntactic particularities that implicitly attach to the morpheme *mais*.

There exist certain distributional constraints on the usage of the two *mais*. Among these constraints, the presence of a negative that is both syntactic and explicit is the most important in determining that the *mais* has adversative value.<sup>6</sup> It is a necessary but not sufficient condition, not sufficient because *mais* preceded by a negative is also susceptible to the reading as being concessive under certain conditions of context. The presence of the negative in the left span of adversative *mais* prevents the two segments of the sentence from being transposed, whereas a transposition is possible if *mais* has its concessive value. An important divergence lies in the way that the connector functions; whereas *maisPA* operates as an argumentative connector that links two propositions, *maisSN* only operates within a single proposition.

In the two constructions, *mais* co-ordinates two linguistic elements: propositions, sentences, syntagmata or words, which are set in opposition to each other by the speaker, but it is not the bidirectional nature of *mais* that determines the semantic functioning of the construction in question; on the contrary, it is the linguistic context in which *mais* finds itself that proves decisive for the reading of how it functions. It is therefore not a question of *mais* having a double nature, but of its functioning in two different ways. I am going to discuss the properties of concessive and adversative constructions in more detail in the following sections, while giving particular consideration to the adversative construction.

## 2. The concessive construction with *mais*

Since the connector *mais* has a bidirectional character, it always imposes an argumentative anti-orientation between its two arguments. The concessive structure is as follows:

(1)  $p \text{ Mais } q$

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<sup>4</sup> *maisPA* corresponds to the meaning of *pero* and *aber*.

<sup>5</sup> *maisSN* corresponds to the meaning of *sino* and *sondern*.

<sup>6</sup> This constraint on the usage of the adversative *mais* coincides with the usage of *sino* and *sondern*.

This structure represents the typical concessive construction where the two arguments  $p$  and  $q$  are joined by *mais*:

- (1') Pierre est beau mais (il est) pauvre.  
[Pierre is good-looking but (he is) poor.]

$p$  refers to 'Pierre's good looks' whereas  $q$  refers to 'Pierre's poverty'. As  $p$  (= the good looks) releases, cognitively, a whole network of ideas and thoughts (eg wealth) (cf the theory of semantic blocks proposed by Carel and Ducrot, see that volume), this argument leads to the conclusion  $r$ , which is not always linguistically marked in discourse, but which has to be found or invented. Argument  $q$ , on the other hand, leads to the opposite conclusion,  $non-r$ , since it too releases a whole network of ideas that, because of the presence of *mais*, stand in opposition to  $p$ . The semantico-logical function of the structure *Mais q* of (1) is formalized according to Nølke (2009) and the ScaPoLine<sup>7</sup> in the following manner:

- (1'') pov<sup>8</sup><sub>1</sub> : [X] (TRUE ( $p$ ))  
pov<sub>2</sub> : [ON] (GEN (if  $p$  then  $r$ ))  
pov<sub>3</sub> : [ $l_0$ ] (TRUE ( $q$ ))  
pov<sub>4</sub> : [ $l_0$ ] (GEN (if  $q$  then  $non-r$ ))<sup>9</sup>

To interpret and understand (1''), the interpreter must find or invent an  $r$  that, in this context, could be *it is worth the effort of getting to know Pierre in order to go out with him*. In this interpretation, the fact that Pierre may be good-looking ( $p$ ) leads to a conclusion *that it is worth the effort of getting to know Pierre in order to go out with him*. According to the entity of discourse  $X$ , who is not necessarily identifiable in the context, it is true that *Pierre is good-looking*. The speaker of the utterance,  $l_0$ , agrees with pov<sub>1</sub>. Public opinion, NO, which constitutes pov<sub>2</sub>, tells us that if a person is good-looking, it is generally admitted (GEN) that this person is also 'socially desirable'. As the textual speaker is part of public opinion, it follows that  $l_0$  agrees with the pov of ON. *Mais* indicates that the second argument  $q$  carries

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<sup>7</sup> As is made clear in Nølke (2004: 94ss), this analysis is based on the classic analyses proposed by Ducrot *et al.* (1980) and by Anscombe (1985).

<sup>8</sup> pov = point of view.

<sup>9</sup> See Nølke (2009).

an argumentative intention that is contrary to the former argument  $p$ . The speaker of the utterance,  $l_0$ , affirms, by  $pov_3$ , that *Pierre is poor* (too) while still agreeing with the conclusion,  $pov_4$ , according to which it is generally admitted (GEN) that if a person is poor, it is not worth getting to know him/her. This latter argument is reckoned to have the greater argumentative force, from which we infer that this example counts as a concessive structure in. The two opposed arguments remain simultaneously valid for all that, although argument  $q$  may be argumentatively the ‘stronger’ and may suggest the conclusion *non-r*. Both  $q$  and  $p$  can be applied to Pierre for  $q$  is just as true as  $p$ . Further, the concessive *mais* may be followed by *quand même* to emphasize the opposition of arguments  $p$  and  $q$ , which gives (1’’) :

- (1’’) Pierre est beau, mais quand même il est pauvre.  
[Pierre is good-looking, but ‘nevertheless’ he is poor?]

It is not necessary for  $p$  and  $q$  to be two complete sentences. The subject and the verb of  $q$  can be removed as in (2):

- (2) Il est républicain, mais honnête.<sup>10</sup>  
[He is republican, but honest.]

In this case we have a structure that resembles an adversative structure but, as we shall see, which always has a syntactic negative in the span to the left of *mais*. However, as Anscombe & Ducrot’s description demonstrates, the concessive *mais* also allows for the presence of a negative in  $p$ , but only under certain conditions:<sup>11</sup> the arguments  $p$  and  $q$  must make available the same argumentative conclusion as in (3):

- (3) X : Carlos parle très bien espagnol. Il est espagnol ?  
Y : Non, il n’est pas espagnol, PA il est argentin.  
(cit. Anscombe & Ducrot 1977 : 30)

[X : Carlos speaks Spanish very well. Is he Spanish?  
Y : No, he isn’t Spanish, PA he is Argentinian.]

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<sup>10</sup> This example is derived from Lakoff (1971): *John is a Republican but he’s honest*.

<sup>11</sup> Since the concessive *mais* is not the subject of my analysis, I am not entering here into the details of the argument, but confine myself to citing some examples from the analysis of Anscombe & Ducrot (1977).



In (4), *p* leads to the conclusion *r*, that *Pierre is not 'socially desirable'* while *q* leads to the opposite conclusion *non-r*, that *one should get to know Pierre all the same because he is rich*:

(4) Pierre n'est pas beau mais (il est) riche.  
[Pierre is not good-looking but (he is) rich.]

(5) Ce n'est pas probable, PA c'est certain.  
(cit. Anscombre & Ducrot 1977 : 30)  
[It is not probable, PA it is certain.]

As a general rule, the segment to the left of concessive *mais* points the argumentation towards a conclusion *r* while the segment to the right directs it towards an opposite conclusion which, argumentatively, remains stronger than the first one.

### 3. Descriptive analysis of the adversative construction with *mais*

At first sight, it seems that the concessive construction of (4) *Pierre is not good-looking but (he is) rich* and the adversative construction in (6) are constructed in almost the same manner :

(6) Pierre n'est pas français mais danois.  
[Pierre is not French but Danish.]

The difference between the two constructions shows in the fact that the concessive construction contains two utterances whose opposition is not mutually exclusive. It is a matter of an indirect opposition expressed through the intermediary of the conclusion *r*, whereas the adversative construction constitutes a single utterance.

An adversative construction such as (6) always includes a syntactic negative in the span to the left of *mais*. We have here a condition that is necessary but, as we have just seen in examples (3), (4) and (5), not sufficient because the concessive construction too is able to include a syntactic negative. The span to the right contains no subject and often no finite

verb either, except obviously in the case where the term that is set in opposition is the finite verb as in:

- (7)<sup>12</sup> L'oie ne glousse mais cacarde.  
[The goose does not cluck but honks.]

The structure of (6) is equivalent to contrastive constructions of another form, but synonymous with the construction with the syntactic negative *ne ... pas*:

- (8) Pierre est non français mais danois.  
[Pierre isn't French but Danish.]

In (8), *non* may be considered as a free variant of *ne ... pas*.

The structure of the adversative construction is represented as in (6'):

- (6') *neg A MAIS B*

The adversative construction of type (6) represents certain particular syntactic properties, which I am going to comment on in what follows.

### **3.1. An utterance – a structure**

The two arguments A and B belong to a single utterance. Only the span to the left of *mais* represents the propositional structure of the utterance, which allows for the presence of the syntactic negative. In the span to the right of *mais*, the finite verb (except obviously in the examples like (7)) and the subject are both omitted. If a subject and a finite verb are added so that we also have a propositional structure here, we would no longer be dealing with an adversative construction: the two arguments A and B are no longer associated with the single (same) proposition, but represent two distinct propositions: 1) *Pierre n'est pas français* ([Peter is not French]) and 2) *il est danois* ([he is Danish]).

As the arguments A and B of the adversative structure belong to the same utterance and they form part of a single structure, the speaker is carrying out a single speech act. A and B are two alternative terms concentrated in a single utterance<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> Examples (7) and (8) and their analysis have been inspired by the highly pertinent commentaries of Claude Muller.

### 3.2. A paradigm

The opposition introduced by *mais* between A and B is an opposition between two constituents, and thus differs from the opposition introduced by the concessive *mais* that opposes two propositions. The opposition in the adversative construction may involve different syntactic elements of the utterance. The nature of the segments able to occupy the place of argument may vary, but the two segments must share a common semantics and that have a syntax of the same type. The linguistic elements capable of functioning as constituents may be:

nominal groups:<sup>14</sup>

(9) Ce n'est pas le froid qui tue les SDF mais le capitalisme...

Comme chaque année au moment des premiers froids, des personnes parmi celles qui sont les plus vulnérables, les plus dépourvues de tout, meurent dans des conditions insupportables. [...] Non, ce n'est pas le froid qui tue mais cette société qui jette impitoyablement à la rue une partie de plus en plus grande de ses travailleurs comme s'ils n'étaient que des mouchoirs jetables.

(www.Nantes.indymedia.org.)

[It is not the cold that is killing the homeless but capitalism...

Like every winter at the first onset of cold weather, people who are among the most vulnerable, deprived of everything, die in intolerable conditions [...] No, it is not the cold that kills but this society which pitilessly chucks into the street more and more of its workers as if they were throw-away handkerchiefs. ]

infinitives :

(10) Traduire n'est pas trahir, mais négocier

Quand on n'y réfléchit pas trop, on s'imagine que traduire, c'est dire la même chose dans une autre langue. Quand on commence à y réfléchir, on se rend compte qu'on ne dit jamais la même chose dans deux langues différentes, et on en conclut qu'il est théoriquement impossible de traduire. Au mieux, on trahit. Et pourtant, il y a toujours eu des traducteurs. Et quand ils traduisent, en réalité ils négocient au coup par coup.

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<sup>13</sup> See Muller (1991) for his proposal of these analyses.

<sup>14</sup> Instances of nominal groups seem very frequent but, seeing that the present analysis is not based on examples drawn from a large corpus, this commentary remains merely intuitive.

(www.fabula.org)

[To translate is not to betray, but to negotiate

Without giving the matter much thought, one can imagine that translating is just saying the same thing in another language. When one starts to reflect, one realizes that one never says the same thing in two different languages, and one concludes from this that it is theoretically impossible to translate at all. At the very best, one misrepresents. And yet, there have always been translators: and, when they translate, what they really do is negotiate with language, taking it on as it comes.]

finite verbs:

(11) The goose does not cluck but honks.

(example (7) repeated)

Adjectives :

(12) « L'enjeu n'est pas quantitatif mais qualitatif »

Le ministre de l'Éducation nationale insiste sur la pluralité des chantiers de modernisation engagés dans le monde éducatif. Il n'exclut pas l'externalisation de certaines activités logistiques.

(www.acteurspublics.com)

[«What is at stake is not quantitative but qualitative»]

The minister of education insists on diversity at premises that are being modernized within the educational sector. He does not exclude a certain amount of logistical out-sourcing.]

prepositional groups:

(13) Nous ne vivons pas sur une planète ronde, mais sur un patatoïde bosselé, qui laisse bouche bée tous ceux qui se retrouvent nez à nez avec son image. Un creux au large de l'Amérique du Sud, une bosse au-dessus de l'Australie et quelques bourrelets par-ci par-là. Cette difformité échappe au voyageur qui arpente la planète et à l'astronaute qui voit la bille bleue dans son cocon de gaz, mais vient fausser une foule de mesures: celles des courants océaniques, des mouvements de la croûte terrestre...

(www.techno-science.net)

[We do not live on a spherical planet, but on a lumpy potatoid, which leaves everyone who is confronted with its image gaping in wonder. A dent off the coast of South America, a hump over Australia and some bulges here and there. This deformity escapes both the globe-trotting traveller and the astronaut who sees the blue ball in its cocoon of gas, but manages to falsify a host of measurements: those of the ocean currents and movements of the earth's crust...]

adverbs:

(14) Nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que l'on vit une situation très difficile et catastrophique. Le manque de la moindre des choses, la nourriture, les chambres sans chauffage, pas d'eau chaude, [...]

Pour toutes ces raisons nous demandons à tous les médias qu'ils soient au courant et qu'ils écoutent les témoignages des retenus. Nous exigeons notre libération et nous commençons une grève de la faim qui durera un délai de 4 jours. **Notre place n'est pas ici mais dehors.**

(www.lmsi.net/ Communiqué des grévistes de la faim du centre de rétention de Vincennes, 20.02.08 )

[We have the honour of informing you that we are living in a situation which is very difficult, even catastrophic. The lack of the very basics – food, unheated rooms, no hot water, [...]

For all these reasons we appeal to all the media to keep track of what is going on and listen to the accounts of those who are being held. We demand our release and we are beginning a hunger strike which will continue for 4 days. **Our rightful place is not here but outside.**]

There is a requirement for semantico-syntactic similarity between the constituents of the two arguments. The predication lies to the left of *mais*, whereas there is none to the right. It is also to the left that the focus of contrast lies, which makes up part of the predication. The focus element to the right is of the same type as that to the left. The two elements linked together by *mais* belong to the same conceptual and syntactic paradigm, from which follows their paradigmatic relationship. Unlike the concessive construction, the whole adversative construction represents a single paradigm.

### 3.3. *The negative*

As emerges from the analysis already put forward by Anscombre & Ducrot, the adversative *mais* requires a negative in the span to the left of *mais*. This negative has to be syntactic, either *ne ... pas* or the synonym *non* (see examples (8) to (14)), whereas a lexical negative as in (15) does not permit an adversative reading:

- (15) \* Il est inintelligent / peu intelligent, mais seulement bûcheur.  
(cit Anscombre & Ducrot 1977 : 35)

[He is unintelligent / not very intelligent, but merely hard-working.]

The negative only covers the element it has in its span and, as noted by Muller (1991: 173): «the contrastive negative can extend its scope to practically anything, including a definite NG or a definite article» (cf also the examples of 3.2 in this article).

### 3.4. *An adversative or a corrective structure?*

The adversative structure covers a paradigmatic relationship where the two elements linked together by *mais* must represent a certain symmetry opposing the two elements that are the focus of attention. However, one may wonder whether, in the utterance *Pierre is not French but Danish*, the two elements *French* and *Danish* possess all the characteristics of adversativity?<sup>15</sup> Indeed, the speaker refutes, by the negative, an expression in the first segment in order to make clear later, in the second, positive segment, what he holds to be correct. The first, negative segment is here being corrected by the second one. In the typical example analysed (cf (6)), nationalities constitute an open list whose elements, in principle, exclude each other mutually, just like the days of the week: 'We're not Friday but Saturday.' The antonymy here is multiple. The antonymy may equally be binary, for example in the opposition '*here* – *elsewhere*'. I postulate then that the structure carries adversative as well as corrective properties. The decision as to which it is depends on the lexico-semantic context.

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<sup>15</sup> For the concept of adversativity, the reader is referred to the treatment in Gettrup & Nølke (1984 : 6) according to which the adversative relation is « paradigmatic, symmetrical and material » which the concessive relation is « syntagmatic, asymmetrical and logical »

## 4. The adversative construction with *mais*

### 4.1. The negative *ne ... pas* and the adversative construction

One of the most important criteria to distinguish concessive and adversative constructions is the presence of a syntactic negative. As the negative is conceived of having a privileged place in polyphony and interrelates with *mais*, which likewise conveys several points of view (cf the concessive structure presented in section 2), we are here dealing with a polyphonic construction that is apparently more complex than concession is.

In accordance with polyphony and with *ScaPoLine*, which follows Ducrot, every negative utterance conveys a positive utterance refuted by the speaker and a negative utterance that it takes responsibility for. In the analysis of the syntactic negative *ne ... pas*, I agree with the analysis proposed by Nølke (1994 : 224) according to which “la seule fonction est d’exprimer la negation” [the sole function [of the syntactic negative] is to express negation]. Its usages however allow different readings according to the level of description. Two basic usage types may be distinguished: namely the descriptive negative and the polemical negative, which has two variants: the metalinguistic negative and the polemical negative, strictly speaking.<sup>16</sup> The descriptive negative serves to describe a state of the world and does not imply the idea of a prior, contrary point of view to which the speaker is opposed. The possible negative in the concessive structure exemplifies this (examples (4) and (5)).<sup>17</sup> The perspective of the scope of the negative is here the proposition.

By employing the polemical negative, the speaker introduces two points of view, which anticipates a polyphonic structure: the  $pov_1$  is “*par défaut – dissocié du locuteur et [...]*  $pov_2$  lui est associé” [by default – dissociated from the speaker and [...]  $pov_2$  is associated with him] (Nølke 1994: 241). As a general rule, identifying the speaker of  $pov_1$  is not an obligatory constraint: the speaker may be real or virtual.

The metalinguistic negative has an effect on the form. Example (16) (repeat of (12) for convenience) could serve as an example, if it is allowed that the speaker is refuting a prior point of view associated with another speaker, then correcting the form of the adjective *quantitative* in the second segment of the utterance:

- (16) « L'enjeu n'est pas quantitatif mais qualitatif »  
[«What is at stake is not quantitative but qualitative»]

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<sup>16</sup> See also the discussion of negative utterances in Perrin (this volume).

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed discussion of negation in the concessive construction, see Anscombe & Ducrot (1977).

The usage of the metalinguistic negative always requires that the entity of discourse of  $pov_1$  should be a speaker other than the one who has responsibility for  $pov_2$ . Without any further context, however, it is difficult to decide whether the negation of (16) is metalinguistic or whether it is a matter of polemical negation, strictly speaking, which affects the utterance. There is every reason to believe that the syntactic negative *ne ... pas* of the adversative construction is always a polemical negative. Thus the adversative construction functions as a strong blocker<sup>18</sup> of a descriptive derivation whereas the negative of the concessive construction will probably always be descriptive. I conclude therefore that the default interpretation of the negative of adversative constructions is polemical.

Let us consider the syntactic negative of the structure *neg A* (*Pierre is not French*). The speaker is opposed to an implicit positive point of view. The negative conveys two different points of view, a positive one whose origin is attributed to another speaker, who may be real or virtual, so that it may be a question of a third person, a law, an opinion etc. It is dissociated from the speaker of the utterance, who imagines that this implicit point of view could have been uttered by someone with whom he associates it. The speaker of the utterance assumes responsibility for the second, negative point of view, which conveys an opposition to the positive point of view. The opposition created by the polemical negative is thus an opposition between the point of view of the speaker of the utterance and that of a speaker who is unidentified or 'virtual'.

According to the *ScaPoLine*, the polemical negative of our typical example (repeat of (6)):

- (17) Pierre n'est pas français mais danois  
[Pierre is not French but Danish.]

implies two points of view that are supposedly contrary:  $pov_1$  precedes the explicit negative point of view,  $pov_2$ , and functions as a 'virtual' antecedent with respect to  $pov_2$  which is that of the speaker of the utterance. He assumes responsibility for it while at the same time refuting – by his use of the negative – the preceding  $pov_1$ . In accordance with *la ScaPoLine*, the structure of *neg A* of example (17) may be illustrated as in (18):

- (18) *Pierre is not French*  
 $pov_1$  : [X] (TRUE ( $p$ ))

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<sup>18</sup> See Nølke (1994 : 245-250) for a discussion of blocking contexts and releasing contexts.



$\text{pov}_2 : [I_0] (\text{FALSE} (\text{pov}_1))$

The  $\text{pov}_1$ , *Pierre is French*, is thus presented as the point of view of someone other than the speaker of the utterance who, indeed, is the source of  $\text{pov}_2$ . Thus there is someone who will have imagined that *Pierre is French*, a point of view that the speaker refutes and to which he sets himself in opposition.

As the speaker is not satisfied with refuting  $\text{pov}_2$ , he adds a correction to it in the form of argument *B* (introduced by *mais*), *but French*, which thus constitutes a third point of view,  $\text{pov}_3$ . It is evident that  $\text{pov}_1$  plays a very important role in the adversative construction seeing that it is emphasized cognitively and that it is this point of view which introduces the inherent polemicity of the utterance, or even the polyphony of the construction.

#### 4.2. Polyphonic analysis of the adversative construction

However, it does seem to me that, in order to explicate the complexity of the adversative structure, there is a need to introduce a preliminary premise as an indispensable condition of  $\text{pov}_1$ . This premise contains the presupposition that says *Pierre has a property*; that *Pierre is of a certain nationality*. This premise must be admitted (*the nationality of Pierre*) as a preliminary given and, consequently, as an extralinguistic given.

In order to argue in favour of the necessity of devising an utterance of the form *neg A MAIS B*, the speaker of the utterance has to feel a certain need in the contextual situation. I shall propose the following formalization of our example according to which the basic logico-semantic structure will be the following:  $P$  (*Pierre*) [where  $P$  is a variable whose domain is composed of nationalities];  $P \neq A$  ( $A = \textit{French}$ ),  $P = B$  ( $B = \textit{Danish}$ )<sup>19</sup>. I propose a polyphonic formalization as in (19):

- (19)       $\text{pov}_1 : [\text{ON}]$  (*Pierre is of a certain nationality*)  
             $\text{pov}_2 : [\text{X}]$  ( $P = A$ ) (*TRUE ('Pierre is A = French')*)  
             $\text{pov}_3 : [I_0]$  (*FALSE (pov<sub>2</sub>)*)  
             $\text{pov}_4 : [I_0]$  ( $P = B$ ) (*TRUE ('Pierre is B = Danish')*)

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<sup>19</sup> According to a more general formalism, the structure would have the following form:

$\text{pov}_1 : [\text{ON}]$  ( $P$  ( $a$ ))  
 $\text{pov}_2 : [\text{X}]$  ( $P = A$ )  
 $\text{pov}_3 : [I_0]$  (*FALSE (pov<sub>2</sub>)*)  
 $\text{pov}_4 : [I_0]$  ( $P = B$ )

The predicate  $P$  contains a particular type of nationality;  $a$  is a logical argument. (cf. also Claude Muller 1991: ch IV, § 5)

The extra-linguistic given,  $pov_1$ , constitutes the precondition of  $pov_2$ . The speaker of the utterance  $l_0$  refutes  $pov_2$ , the responsibility for which cannot be imputed to him; on the contrary, he assumes responsibility for  $pov_3$  as well as for  $pov_4$  which he works out from  $pov_3$ , his first point of view. Now, the speaker could have contented himself with producing the utterance ( $pov_4$ ), *Pierre is Danish*, an utterance that satisfies the supposed extra-linguistic given *Pierre is of a particular nationality*. The reason why the speaker does not content himself with utterance  $pov_4$  is that he is following the laws of discourse according to which every speech exchange is governed by the co-operation principle proposed by Grice. It is generally agreed that a negative utterance requires more cognitive effort than a positive utterance. According to the maxim of relevance, every utterance must contribute to the relevance of the discourse, which means that the negative utterance has considerable relevance in the circumstances in question. In this language exchange it is as relevant for the speaker to refute ( $pov_3$ ), the mistaken point of view ( $pov_2$ ), as it is for him to correct it ( $pov_4$ ). The opposition signalled by *mais* consists also – as we have seen previously – in two points of view, a  $pov_3$  which is the refutation by the speaker of an earlier  $pov$  and an adversative  $pov_4$  which is also his own and for which he assumes responsibility.

Unlike the concessive construction, the speaker of the utterance  $l_0$  of the adversative construction assumes responsibility for two points of view, of which the first,  $pov_3$ , containing a polemical negative, provides proof the polysemous nature of the utterance whereas, in the second point of view,  $pov_4$ ,  $l_0$  enters into a 'dialogue' with himself, at the same time correcting and clarifying his first point of view. The adversative construction provides proof both of external polyphony, pointing to an interlocutor who is indeterminate and perhaps even virtual, with whom the speaker of the utterance enters into a dialogue, and of an internal polyphony where the speaker enters into a something resembling a dialogue with himself. The true character of the construction with *mais* that is said to be adversative is thus that the utterance covers internal polyphony just as well: the speaker of the utterance enters into a dialogue with himself in the framework of the utterance as well as the external polyphony:<sup>20</sup> the speaker refutes a point of view that is not his own. But the polyphony is articulated in a single speech act with a single speaker.

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<sup>20</sup> For a definition of internal and external polyphony, see Nølke (1985).

## 5. By way of conclusion

As we have seen, it can be difficult to identify the concessive or adversative nature of a sentence that contains the connector *mais* and a syntactic negative. The prototypical bond conveyed by *mais* represents a contrast that is found in both adversative constructions and concessive constructions. The connector *mais* of adversative structures always links linguistic elements belonging to the same syntactic and semantic paradigm. The adversative relation is established by *mais* between a refuted argument and a positive, corrective argument in the interior of a single proposition. The analysis of the adversative construction that I have proposed shows that the structure conveys a single speech act and that there is only a single speaker who begins by refuting a point of view expressed by another speaker, real or virtual, after which he enters into a dialogue with himself while at the same time correcting the first, refuted point of view. My polyphonic analysis has thus allowed me to lay out the special properties of the adversative construction of the type *Pierre n'est pas français mais danois* ([*Pierre is not French but Danish*]) which represents, within a single proposition, a polyphony that is both external and internal. These findings indicate that the adversative construction with *mais* does convey polyphony, but that it is an exceptional case of a polyphonic structure.

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# Polemic and Descriptive Negations

## The Effect of Prominence and Register on the Interpretation of Negations

Camilla Søballe Horslund

### 1. Introduction

Linguistic polyphony as studied within the framework of ScaPoLine is a developing research field of enunciation linguistics. The focus of the utterance situation and the instructional view of semantics, so central to enunciation linguistics (Nølke 2007, 103), pose the basis for ScaPoLine as well (Nølke 2006, 9-10). Generally, enunciation linguistics seeks to explore to which degree language meaning is coded in the linguistic form (Nølke 2007, 102), and ScaPoLine specifies in the linguistic coding of polyphony (Nølke 2006, 9).

Polyphony is the presence of more 'voices'; hence the name. When dealing with linguistic polyphony, the focus is on 'voices', usually termed Points of View (POV), at the utterance level. The interesting point is that other POVs than the speaker's may be present. The typical example of linguistic polyphony is negation. In the utterance 'the wall is not white', the speaker denies the POV that the wall is indeed white. Thus, this POV is present in the utterance even though the speaker denies its content (Nølke 2007, 111-112). There are several linguistic cues to polyphony at the utterance level. Nevertheless, this paper will be limited to dealing with polyphony related to negations.

Within enunciation linguistics, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is less clear and of less concern than in most other linguistic traditions (Nølke 2007, 101). Consequently, I will treat semantics and pragmatics as closely related. So, with regard to semantics and pragmatics, negations can be used in three different ways, which gives rise to a typology of three different types of negations: 1) the descriptive negation, 2) the

polemic negation, and 3) the meta-linguistic negation (Nølke 1999, 4). The example above is of the second kind, showing that the distinction between these types is related to polyphony. The descriptive and the polemic negations are endpoints on a continuum, and the meta-linguistic negation is a subtype of the polemic negation. I will get back to the relationship between the different types in the next section. At this point, it should suffice to notice that the negation as such may be more or less central to the meaning of the utterance.

The interesting question, then, is which factors affect how we interpret a certain negation. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the role of morphosyntactic and prosodic prominence as well as register and social setting. On the basis of the generally accepted assumption that the most important aspects of an utterance are given most articulatory emphasis (Kreidler 1998, 31), it seems plausible to expect that if the negation as such is central to the meaning of the utterance (as in polemic negations), the negation will be articulated prominently in order to emphasise this importance. Likewise, if the negation is not central to the meaning of the utterance, it should not be articulated prominently. Moreover, it is plausible to expect descriptive negations to be more common in certain social context or genres such as the description of a city on a guided tour or in a guide book, weather forecasts and public information at railway stations, airports and such places. Similarly, polemic negations are more likely to come up in political debates and legal discussions in court, for instance.

Previous studies have shown a relation between articulatory prominence and register, which may further inform the analysis. Hence, I will investigate how articulatory prominence and register may either work in concert or oppose each other with respect to the cues they provide for the interpretation.

### **1.1. Delimitations**

Broadly speaking, negations can be divided into morphosyntactic negations (with the negation being represented by a specific morpheme or word) and semantic negations (that is, implied negation, e.g. 'hardly' and 'seldom'). English has three primary forms of morphosyntactic negations; not-negation, no-negation and affixal negation. Not-negation,

also called sentential negation, is the most common one (Kaufmann 2002, 1476-1477). It negates an entire phrase or clause (Nølke 1999, 6-7). No-negation and affixal negation is more closely tied to one or few words. No-negation can consist of either two or more words as in 'no (single) wall in the house is white' or of one single word that contains both the negation and the negated item as in 'nothing', 'no-one' and 'nowhere'. Examples of affixal negation are 'uncomfortable', 'impossible' and 'incomprehensible'. Here, the affixes 'un', 'im' and 'in' represent the negation (Kaufmann 2002, 1476-1475). The focus of the present paper is solely on sentential negation. Consequently, whenever referring to negations in the following, I mean to refer only to this form.

In English, negations can be fully articulated as in 'this wall is not white', or not-contracted as in 'this wall isn't white'. For some verbs there is also the possibility of auxiliary-contraction (aux-contraction) as in 'this wall's not white' (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2003, 213). Note that the negation retains its full form in aux-contractions. In addition to this morphosyntactic variation, negations can be given prosodic emphasis or not. This emphasis can be in either pitch or intensity or in both (Kaufmann 2002, 1476).

## **1.2. Outline**

The investigation of the relations between articulation, register and interpretation will be done by relating previous results primarily to the framework of ScaPoLine, but also to other relevant theories and concepts within enunciation linguistics. The paper will start out with a presentation of the polyphonic approach, focusing on ScaPoLine, followed by a literature review of the relevant theories and results regarding morphosyntactic and prosodic articulation of negations, focusing particularly on how prominence is related to register. Subsequently, I will present an analysis that further connects previous findings in this research area to the polyphonic approach, ending with suggestions to how this analysis may contribute to the polyphonic framework. The paper will end with a conclusion.

## **2. Relevant Theory**

To equip ourselves for the analysis, we must dwell a little on linguistic polyphony, specifically we must familiarise ourselves with the terminology of ScaPoLine.

## **2.1. Linguistic Polyphony**

The term 'polyphony', which is borrowed from music, has been used by philologists to describe the phenomenon of dialogue in language. Polyphony refers to the presence of more voices in a text, and the phenomenon has been addressed at different levels. Following the pioneering work of Mikhail Bakhtin, literates have studied polyphony at the text level, while linguists have studied polyphony at the utterance level (Nølke 2006, 2). I will adopt this latter approach in the present analysis. More specifically, I will apply ScaPoLine, a theory of linguistic polyphony, on the topic of negations. Hence, I will briefly introduce ScaPoLine.

### **2.1.1. ScaPoLine**

ScaPoLine, as a theory within the enunciation approach, views the utterance as an image of the utterance act. In other words, the protagonists of the utterance act leave traces in the utterance. These traces are seen as instructions regarding the interpretation of the utterance (Nølke 2006, 6-7). Central to the methodology of ScaPoLine is the distinction between the Polyphonic Structure, which is the instructions coded in the linguistic form, and the Polyphonic Configuration, which is the polyphonic interpretation of the utterance. The theoretical object of ScaPoLine is the Polyphonic Structure, which cannot be examined directly. Thus, this theoretical object is examined through its empirical manifestation, the Polyphonic Configuration (Nølke 2006, 9).

The aim of this section is to show how different types of negations can be analysed in a polyphonic perspective. However, before turning to the analysis of negations, the relevant terminology of ScaPoLine needs to be introduced.

#### **2.1.1.1. Terminology**

ScaPoLine has a richly developed terminology, which facilitates description of subtle detail in the utterance form. Yet, not all detail is equally important for the present analysis, which is why I will limit my presentation to the terms of direct importance for the analysis of



different types of negations. Following the distinction between Polyphonic Structure and Polyphonic Configuration, the configuration contains images of the utterance participants. The configuration is constructed by the locutor and contains four central elements:

- The locutor as constructor (LOC) assumes responsibility for the utterance according to the utterance.
- The points of view (POVs) are semantic units expressed in the utterance (the different voices of the utterance).
- The discourse entities (DEs) are the semantic sources of the POVs (the persons in the discourse).
- The enunciative links (links) connect the DEs to the POVs (Nølke 2006, 11).

LOC is defined as an image of the speaker in his role as constructor. LOC as such cannot have POVs. In order to have POVs, he must construct an image of himself as a DE (Nølke 2006, 12). There is a general rule in ScaPoLine that in every utterance, LOC constructs an image of himself as a DE and at least one POV that this DE takes responsibility for (Nølke 2009, 6).

The POV consists of a source (the DE presenting the POV), a judgement, and the content that is judged. The distinction between judgement and content follows Bally's distinction between *Modus* and *Dictum*. ScaPoLine operates with two main types of POVs: 1) Simple POVs and 2) complex POVs. Complex POVs may be either hierarchical or relational. As we shall see, negated utterances contain a hierarchical POV (Nølke 2006, 12-13).

The DEs are constructed as images of the different discourse referents. The most important DEs are the images of the Locutor and the Addressee, the protagonists of the discourse. These are constituent elements of the discourse, and hence always present in the discourse. DEs can be more or less specified, and negations present an example of a completely unspecified DE (Nølke 2006, 12-14), at least at the linguistic level.

ScaPoLine adopts a primary distinction between responsibility links and non-responsibility links. The source of a given POV is by definition responsible for that POV. The non-responsibility links can take different forms; they can be subdivided into refutation links and non-refutation links. Non-refutation links can be further divided on a scale from quite

positive (almost acceptance) to quite negative (almost refutation) (Nølke 2006, 14-15). We shall see that negated utterances contain a refutation link.

Now we should be sufficiently equipped for analysing negations as elements of a polyphonic configuration.

#### *2.1.1.2. Polyphony in Negations*

Recall the typology of negations presented above; descriptive, polemic and meta-linguistic. We will look at each in turn.

When used descriptively, the negation as such is not central to the meaning of the utterance. Instead, the negation constructs a new predicate in combination with another predicate, as in the following example:

‘There is not a cloud in the sky.’

Clearly, this utterance is rarely meant as a counterargument to the POV that there is indeed a cloud in the sky. Most often this negation is purely descriptive, synonymous to ‘the sky is clear’.

Another example is:

‘She is not quite 30.’

Likewise, this utterance is not meant to negate the POV that she is t30 years. On the contrary, the aim of the utterance is to describe her age as 29 years or more broadly as somewhere in her late 20s.

Conversely, when used polemically, the negation is central to the meaning of the utterance, as in the example from above: ‘this wall is not white’. This utterance contains two contradicting POVs:

POV1: This wall is white

POV2: POV1 is false

Consequently, the utterance contains two DEs; the image of the speaker, who is responsible for POV2 and the unspecified DE responsible for POV1. Thus, this utterance presents a dialogue between POV1 and 2, in which POV2 gets the last word, so to speak. This is the hierarchical aspect of the POV-structure of negations that I mentioned earlier; the speaker's POV, which is the negating POV (POV2), is always higher than the negated POV (POV1) in the hierarchy.

Another example, frequently uttered in political debates, is the claim that:

'We do not intend to raise taxes.'

Following the logic of polyphony, this is a clumsy way to state one's tax policy, since it is presented in a way that allows the opponents' POV to be present in the discourse. This is clear in the polyphonic analysis:

POV1: We intend to raise taxes (the opponents' POV)

POV2: POV1 is false

Though the negating POV 'wins the discussion', the positive POV is still present in the discourse, which cannot be advantageous for the speaker in a political debate. A more strategic way of communicating this tax policy is to simply say 'we intend to stabilise taxes'. This utterance is monophonic and thus no other POVs than the speaker's is present in the discourse.

The third type of negation is the meta-linguistic negation. An example is:

'Peter is not fortunately married.'

In fact, this sentence is ambiguous with respect to its polyphonic status. It may be read as either a polemic negation or as a meta-linguistic negation. The polemic reading states that

it is wrong that Peter is fortunately married, meaning that Peter is poorly married. Thus, the polyphonic configuration is similar to the above examples with the wall and the tax policy:

POV1: Peter is fortunately married

POV2: POV1 is false

In this case ‘fortunately’ modifies ‘married’. Conversely, in the meta-linguistic reading, ‘fortunately’ modifies the entire clause. The meta-linguistic negation also contains two POVs, but unlike the polemic negation, the POVs of the meta-linguistic negation are not in direct opposition to each other, as in the present example:

POV1: Peter is fortunately married

POV2: ‘fortunately’ is the wrong word to describe the fact that Peter is married

Thus, the meta-linguistic negation provides a linguistic correction of the previous speaker’s utterance. As a result of that, meta-linguistic negations are often uttered right after the utterance it seeks to correct (Nølke 1999, 4). The meta-linguistic negation is thus a subtype of the polemic negation, since it contradicts a former POV, though not on a content level, but on a linguistic level. A cue to distinguish between the two readings is the prosodic pattern. When used meta-linguistically, the object of linguistic correction, in our case ‘fortunately’, is usually pronounced with emphatic stress, whereas the linguistic unit in question does not carry much sentential stress when used polyphonically. Note that the word in question carries its lexical stress regardless of the semantic nature of the sentence it appears in (For a brief introduction to the distinction between word stress and sentential stress in English, see Bohn and Caudery 2009, 89-93).

We shall look primarily at the two main types; the descriptive and the polemic negation.

Within a polyphonic perspective, the descriptive negation is a derivation of the original polemic negation. This is evident by the fact that negations usually interpreted as descriptive may be used polemically in the right context. Imagine someone telling you that the weather forecast predicts that it will be a cloudy day. In such a situation, when uttering

'there is not a cloud on the sky', upon seeing the clear sky out of the window, this usually descriptive negation becomes polemic.

Contrary, polemic negations cannot be used descriptively. It is impossible to imagine a situation in which 'this wall is not white' is purely descriptive. A pure description of the wall would use the actual colour of the wall instead. Accordingly, the polyphonic argument is that the polemic aspect is always present to some extent. That is, there are no purely descriptive negations. The classification, then, is based on how obvious the polemic aspect is (Nølke 1999, 4-5).

When classifying negations, one can make use of a range of linguistic phenomena that either restrict or promote a descriptive derivation (Nølke 1999, 6). This paper will investigate whether the prominence of negations can be seen as either restricting or promoting a descriptive interpretation. Specifically, the paper will investigate the effects of contraction-strategy and prosodic emphasis on the interpretation of negations. Furthermore, the paper will investigate the role of social setting as promoting or restricting a descriptive reading. Let me therefore briefly present the terms *promoters* and *restrictors* of a descriptive reading.

Promoters of a descriptive reading can basically be anything in the utterance situation that strengthens the derivation from the polemic negation. Examples of such promoters are scalar predicates as in 'she is not quite 30', standardised descriptions as 'there is not a cloud on the sky', a descriptive genre, and the rare condition that a certain meaning cannot be said without a negation. Likewise, restrictors can be anything that weakens the derivation from the polemic negation. Restrictors are essentially phenomena that point to the existence of an alternative, for instance non-scalar predicates such as colours, clefts as in 'it was not me who ate your cookie', topic shifts, phrases expressing uncertainty or reservations such as 'it seems that', an argumentative genre, and significant polyphonic markers in the context (Personal notes).

The interesting question, which the present analysis seeks to answer, is whether morphosyntactic and prosodic prominence as well as register can be seen as promoters or restrictors.

Before turning to this analysis, though, I will briefly present the theories and results of previous studies investigating the choice between different articulations of negations.

### 3. Previous Studies on Contraction and Prosody in Negations

Various factors, such as regional dialect and the kind of social context, have been shown to influence the choice between the different morphosyntactic and prosodic realisations of negations. Some of the context studies, in particular, have presented results that are interesting from a polyphonic perspective. We will look first at sociolinguistic factors and subsequently at semantic and pragmatic factors.

#### 3.1. Sociolinguistic Factors

The strongest predictor of contraction strategy in negations is dialect (Yaeger-Dror & Hall-Lew 2002, 189; Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 107), the effect of which overrides register effects as well as time and genre effects in literary texts (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 109-110). Full negations are more common in British English than in American English (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 80). Besides, the ranges of aux-contraction (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 83) and not-contraction (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 106) vary more in British dialects than in American dialects. What is more, British and American English differ with regard to which auxiliaries are most often contracted; in British English *will*, *is* and *are* are the most frequent examples of aux-contractions, while *have*, *is* and *are* are most often contracted in American English (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 83).

The further north one goes in Britain, as long as one does not go past York, the more likely speakers are to use aux-contraction (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 101). London, however, does not fit this pattern. In fact, there appears to be a socioeconomic distinction for London, with working class speakers using aux-contractions very rarely and upper- and middle-class speakers using aux-contraction oftener (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 104). Moreover, in British English, the realisation of not-contraction of *are* varies with r-fullness; in rhotic dialects *ain't*

or *amn't* is used, whereas *aren't* is used in non-rhotic dialects (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 83-34).

Within American English, not-contraction is most common in the North, and aux-contraction is most common in the South. Indeed, Northerners are 88 times as likely as Southerners to use not-contraction (Yaeger-Cror & Hall-Lev 2002, 189), though working class Southerners use *ain't* more often than middle-class Southerners. In fact, middle-class Southerners seem to use aux-contraction to avoid *ain't* (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 84).

Dialect also affects prosodic prominence. In the US, Southerners are slightly less likely to emphasise negations than speakers from the North (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2003, 219). Moreover, prosodically prominent negations are more common among younger speakers and speakers from specific ethnic groups, and the general tendency is towards a growing use of prosodically prominent negations in American English (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2003, 211).

Regardless of their importance, dialect and other sociolinguistic factors are not of primary interest in the present analysis. We will therefore leave them for now and turn to semantic and pragmatic factors. My main point with this section is to emphasise that dialect cannot be ignored when analysing contraction strategies and prosodic prominence. Hence, all tendencies presented in the following should be seen as general tendencies which may (and probably will) be mediated by dialect.

### **3.2. Semantic and Pragmatic Factors**

According to the Cognitive Control Principle, negations are expected to be prominent both with respect to morphosyntax and prosody, because they bring new information into the discourse. But overall, this principle has not found sufficient empirical support. Yet, in Informational settings, in which the focus is on the content, the principle seems to apply (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 80-81; 2003, 210). That is, the negation will be prominent in utterances such as the airport warning 'do not walk under the wing', the news rapport stating that 'the parties have not yet reached an agreement, and the sales assistant informing the customer that 'the coat does not come in purple'.

Quite contrary to the Cognitive Control Principle, people often attempt to downplay their negations (not-contraction or no prosodic prominence) when interacting with other people. This phenomenon, which has been termed the Social Agreement Principle, indicates that the disagreement presented by negations is not socially acceptable (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2003, 210-211). Thus, the negation will not be prominent in such utterances as when telling a whodunit author that you 'don't really like detective stories', the friend recommending that 'you shouldn't wear black', and telling your boss that you 'haven't finished the work' he asked you to do. Common to these examples, is the aim of downplaying the disagreement by de-emphasising the negation.

Disagreement is only socially acceptable in specific social contexts, such as political debates, in which people emphasise their negations to a higher degree and adopt what one could call a reverse Social Agreement Principle (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 81-82). Examples of this would be the Opposition leader stating that 'the government did not investigate the power abuse thoroughly', the prosecutor declaring that 'the suspect did not leave the premises at 2 pm as he claims because he was seen there by a witness at 4 pm', and the Finance Minister explaining that 'the Opposition's draft budget is not realistic'. Contrary to the above examples, these are all examples of utterances in which the disagreement aspect is sought highlighted by a prominent negation.

Thus, there seems to be a primary distinction between Informational and Interactive settings, which can be explained with reference to the most statistically significant of Biber's five register continua, his continuum from *Informational* to *Involved* (also termed *Interactive*). It is well established that this and other register factors influence contraction strategies (Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, 80). Though this distinction is gradual, seeing as it refers to two poles on a continuum, let us for analytical purposes look only at the poles, interpreting them as ideal types in a Weberian sense (Månson, 2007, 93). The different uses of negations within the different registers may plausibly mirror the above mentioned distinction between descriptive and polemic negations. Note, however, that according to this argument, descriptive negations are related to prominent articulation, contrary to the above hypothesis.



As a matter of fact, there seems to be empirical support for making a further distinction within Interactive settings, between on the one hand Supportive settings, where the Social Agreement Principle prevails, and on the other hand Adversarial settings, where the reverse Social Agreement Principle prevails.

Summing up, the evidence of previous studies support a register effect distinguishing between an Informational register, in which the Cognitive Control Principle applies, an Involved Supportive register, in which the Social Agreement Principle applies, and finally an Involved Adversarial register, in which the reverse Social Agreement Principle applies.

If informational use of negation is similar to descriptive use of negation, this gives rise to the association between descriptive negations and prominence, contrary to the earlier hypothesis of the present paper. This seems to present a paradox. Likewise, the Social agreement Principle and the reverse of this principle seem to relate to the polemic use of negation, though with two different perspectives. Where the Social Agreement Principle is a principle of downplaying the negation in order to hide the polemic aspect of it, the reverse Social Agreement Principle is a principle of emphasising the polemic aspect of negation. Thus, the hypothesis above, that polemic negations will be prominent, applies only to Adversarial settings; for Supportive settings the present argument hypothesises the exact opposite, presenting another paradox.

Let us now turn to the analysis to see how we can further combine the register effect and ScaPoLine, as well as consider if and how we may solve the two paradoxes.

#### **4. Analysis**

The aim of this analysis is to present a tentative attempt at combining the insights from the register effect with ScaPoLine. We will first analyse how the Cognitive Control Principle, the Social Agreement Principle and the reverse Social Agreement Principle can be interpreted within a polyphonic perspective. Then we will move on to investigate how this insight may contribute to the polyphonic approach in general and to ScaPoLine in specific.

#### ***4.1. The Register Effect in a Polyphonic Perspective***

In this section, I will apply the ScaPoLine terminology outlined above on the three settings (Informational, Adversarial, and Supportive) in order to see what a polyphonic approach to the Cognitive Control Principle, the Social Agreement Principle, and the reverse Social Agreement Principle will bring forward. The section will also present an analysis of the relationship between the prominence of negations, register and the type of negation. The section is structured by means of the ScaPoLine terminology.

##### *4.1.1. LOC*

Recall that LOC is the image of the speaker as constructor of the utterance. With regard to the three different settings, LOC may be said to construct utterances according to different logics. These different logics may, among others, be the Cognitive Control Principle, the Social Agreement Principle and the reverse Social Agreement Principle. The choice between contraction strategies (aux-contraction or not-contraction) may plausibly be related to this choice of logic, which may be affected by contextual factors, meaning that the context may affect LOCs choice regarding which POVs to present, which DEs to construct images of, and how to link the DEs and the POVs. We will now turn to these factors.

##### *4.1.2. POVs*

As mentioned above, a POV consists of a source, the content and a judgement. I speculate that these three aspects of the POV may carry different weight in different settings. It seems plausible that the content aspect is most central in Informational settings, in accordance with the Cognitive Control Principle. Likewise, it seems plausible that the other two aspects are more important in Interactive settings. The importance of social relations in Interactive settings makes the source aspect central. The judgement aspect is also related to social relations, seeing as our judgements of our interlocutors' POVs may very well affect our relationship to these interlocutors. This is exactly the argument of the Social Agreement Principle; in Supportive settings we try to judge others' POVs as positively as possible, and when we judge them negatively, as for instance when negating them, we try to downplay this judgement by de-emphasising the negation. Use of not-contraction instead of aux-contraction is a way to downplay a negation. In Adversarial settings, however, we want to

emphasise the difference between ourselves and others, which can be done through use of polemic negations, among other things. With regard to contraction strategy, aux-contraction seems to fit the adversarial logic best, seeing as it leaves the negation in its full form. One last point to make here is that the hierarchical structure of negations may be used as a tool when establishing and strengthening power relations (For an introduction to discursive aspects of power relations see Howarth 2000, chapters 4 and 6).

#### 4.1.3. DEs

A crucial difference when uttering negations in Interactive as opposed to Informational settings is that the DE responsible for the negated POV (POV1) often will be present in Interactive settings. In other words, the social context provides information regarding the identification of the linguistically unspecified DE responsible for the negated POV. Consequently, we might immediately be held responsible for any judgements we present. We therefore reduce the force of our judgements, if we are not ready to fight for them. This will be the case in Supportive settings, whereas we will usually fight for our POVs in Adversarial settings. Thus, the social specification of the linguistically unspecified DE responsible for the negated POV affects our articulation of negations. Note that this specification is non-linguistic, which might make the negative judgement seem less harsh than a linguistically direct accusation. Yet, the specification will affect our articulation of the negation, depending on our willingness to openly contradict the other speaker.

#### 4.1.4. Links

Linguistically speaking, negations contain a refutation link between POV1 (the negated POV) and the DE responsible for POV2, and according to ScaPoLine, one either rejects a POV or not. However, the force of the refutation may be reduced linguistically (Kaufman, 1481). Let us turn to our prior example to see how this may be done.

In its plain form 'this wall is not white', nothing is done to reduce the force of the refutation. Yet, in the following examples, the refutation is not quite as strong (unless interpreted ironically, but the effects of irony is outside the scope of the present paper and should not occupy us here):

‘This wall is not completely white’

‘This wall is not really white’

Inserting ‘completely’ in this example has a strong reduction effect on the refutation. It gives the impression that the speaker only partly disagrees that the wall is white and thereby partly agrees that it is. Inserting ‘really’ has sort of the same effect, though the effect is somewhat weaker. Of course, there are numerous other ways of reducing the strength of the refutation, and the present examples are only meant to illustrate the point. One can also imagine linguistic means to enforce the strength of a refutation. Consider the following examples:

‘This wall is not at all white’

‘This wall is so not white’

‘This wall is not the least white’

In these utterances, the speaker not only refutes the POV that the wall is white, he also points out that this POV is very far from the truth, thereby hinting at the silliness of thinking the wall white.

Let us now take a closer look at negations.

#### **4.2. Negations**

We will now see how register and prominence contribute to the interpretation of negations. Can they be interpreted as promoters or restrictors of a descriptive reading?

It seems plausible to interpret negations in Informational settings as primarily descriptive. After all, Informational settings are defined by their focus on information as such. Yet, the articulation of negations in Informational settings seems to present somewhat of a paradox; why are negations prominent in Informational settings, if the negation as such is not central to the utterance (which descriptive negations are not)? The paradox arises from the co-existence of a promoter of a descriptive reading, namely the Informational register, and a restrictor of a descriptive reading, namely the prominence of the negation. These two

entities pull the interpretation in different directions on the continuum, creating a cross-pressure.

One additional consideration in this respect is that Informational settings present a focus on content, and that content-wise, negations may be seen as important detail. In other words, people might emphasise negations in Informational settings because they are afraid to be misunderstood if they do not. Thus, the negation can be prominent and still descriptive if the negation is important for the description. An example of this is the standardised airport information saying 'do not walk under the wing'. This formulation adds a polemic aspect to the information, placing the POV that one might walk under the wing in the discourse. Considering the safety reasons for this information, it seems highly unfortunate to make the positive POV part of the discourse, and one could avoid the polemic aspect altogether by saying 'walking under the wing is prohibited'. Nevertheless, this option is rarely used, maybe because *prohibited* is such a strongly negative word that using it unnecessarily seems slightly rude.

The lack of prominence in Supportive settings is also somewhat paradoxical. The negations are polemic, strictly speaking, because they relate to and negate positive utterances in the discourse. Yet, they are articulated without prominence. Similar to the paradox of the prominent negations in Informational settings, the present paradox arises from the co-existence of a promoter and a restrictor of a descriptive interpretation. In this case, the promoter is the lack of prominence in the negations, and the restrictor is the dialogical aspect of the negations (the interactive setting). This combination may be due to speakers trying to 'hide' or downplay the polemic aspect of negations in order to reduce the disagreement. In polyphonic terms, one can say that they use the lack of prominence as a promoter of a descriptive interpretation in order to outplay the register as restrictor of a descriptive derivation.

With regard to Adversarial settings, the pattern seems more straightforward. Negations are articulated prominently because the polemic aspect is central. In this setting, negations can be used to emphasise the disagreements between the speakers as part of a relational

definition. In other words, there are no promoters of a descriptive interpretation. Instead both setting and prominence are restrictors, both strengthening the polemic interpretation.

With this section, I hope to have clarified that interpreting a negation is a matter of weighing promoters and restrictors against each other to come to some sort of conclusion. Since this is a subjective assessment, interpretations of the same utterance will vary across listeners. Moreover, it will often be a matter of assessing not only which type a certain negation is, but also the degree to which it is of that type, or to put it in other words, its place on the continuum from polemic to descriptive. I further need to point out that the above analysis is based solely on general tendencies that cannot be applied to every single negation. The tendencies put forward may be helpful tools when interpreting a specific negation, but they are merely tendencies, not deterministic factors, and in a given analysis, there will always be a number of other relevant factors not accounted for here.

As this section has shown, both register and morphosyntactic and prosodic emphasis are important factors to investigate, when interpreting negations. Let us now consider how the insights provided by the present analysis may contribute to the polyphonic approach.

#### **4.3. *Contributions to the Polyphonic Approach and Suggestions for Further Research***

The primary point of the above analysis is the strategic element in communication; the fact that locutors construct their utterances according to different logics depending on the setting and register of the utterance situation. This strategic element fits well with the focus on traces of the utterance situation, which is central to the framework of enunciation linguistics. More specifically, the strategic element provides a nuance to the distinction between descriptive and polemic negations, adding the distinction between openly polemic negations, common in Adversarial debates, and hidden polemic negations, common in Supportive settings. A cue to this distinction is the existence or lack of prosodic and morphosyntactic prominence in the negation. Articulatory prominence may, as shown above, work as a restrictor of a descriptive derivation. However, this analysis has only sporadically investigated the effects of prominence, and many aspects of prominence are

still to be examined within a polyphonic perspective. The main point here is that both prosody and contraction strategies are relevant factors in a polyphonic analysis.

Talking of future research areas for polyphonists, I would like to bring attention to the polyphonic opportunities within the area of discourse analysis. The tradition of enunciation linguistics in general, with its focus on the utterance situation, and specifically ScaPoLine, with its focus on dialogical aspects of the utterance, seem highly suitable tools for discourse analyses. The strategic aspect of polyphony brought forward in the present paper further highlights these opportunities. In a strategic perspective, the distinction between polemic and descriptive negations seems somewhat related to Laclau and Mouffe's distinction between the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference, on which they base their discourse analysis (Howarth 2000, 155). Other ScaPoLine terms may moreover present useful tools for identifying logics of equivalence or difference. Among others, the enunciative links and the construction of other DEs seem particularly relevant areas of focus in a discourse analysis, especially if analysing antagonistic relations, which is exactly Laclau and Mouffe's approach (Thomsen 2007, 187).

The suggestions for further research put forward here links linguistic polyphony with other research areas, which is in accordance with the modular approach of ScaPoLine. The basic idea is that of a general theory encompassing a number of autonomous subsystems governed by local rules and tied together by global rules (Nølke 2006, 5). Adopting this line of thought, ScaPoLine may be viewed as such a module and the analytical combination of ScaPoLine and, say, discourse analysis will be a relation between two modules and thereby governed by global rules.

Due to the modular approach, it is vastly productive to combine polyphonic analyses with related research areas within linguistics and perhaps also disciplines in the interface between linguistics and sociology, such as discourse analysis. Future research will probably find more relevant links between ScaPoLine and other theories and research areas.

## 5. Conclusion

This paper set out to investigate the relation between linguistic polyphony, articulatory prominence and register in sentential negations. This investigation has brought forward five main points:

- Morphosyntactic and prosodic prominence in negations both point to a polemic interpretation and are thus restrictors of a descriptive derivation. Note that the two factors are closely related, seeing as a negation cannot be prosodically prominent if it is morphosyntactically contracted.
- Register is another cue to polyphony. Informational registers promote a descriptive reading, while Interactive registers restrict a descriptive reading. An interesting point in this respect is that the attitude towards the polemic aspect of the negation varies within Interactive registers, giving rise to the distinction between Adversarial registers, in which the polemic aspect is emphasised, and Supportive registers, in which the polemic aspect is downplayed.
- There is a strong relation between articulatory prominence and register; negations are most often prominent in Informational and Adversarial registers and rarely so in Supportive registers. This tendency crosses the distinction between polemic and descriptive negations, showing that prominence is not only related to the importance of the negation as such, but also to the social structures of the utterance situation.
- Both morphosyntactic contraction and prosodic emphasis are highly dialect specific. Hence, all tendencies presented here are likely to be modulated by dialect, making dialect an important factor to consider in concrete interpretations.
- The modular approach as well as the useful tools of ScaPoLine makes it suitable for combination with other theories and research areas. Among others, I suggest that the relation between linguistic polyphony and discourse analysis is investigated further.

Thus, polyphony in negations is a rather complicated phenomenon, but I sure hope that the present analysis has shed light on some of the relevant factors affecting interpretations of negations.



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## Types of discourse entities in *ScaPoLine*

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The study of linguistic polyphony is primarily concerned with all the « voices » which create this polyphony throughout utterances and texts. It is precisely the distinction between the speaker (locutor) and the *énonciateurs*, understood as the « voices » presented by him, which is at the origin of linguistic polyphony such as was developed in the work of Anscombre and Ducrot. Greatly inspired by these authors, for over twenty years now we have been elaborating a linguistic polyphony theory which we baptized, some ten years ago, as *ScaPoLine* (the SCandinavian theory of LINguistic POLyphony). Although remaining true to the essentials of Ducrot's approach, *ScaPoLine* has made a number of theoretical choices which render it distinct. These differences lie not in another conception of linguistic polyphony but in a difference in the goals sought. Our ambition is to create a formalized theory which is able to identify and define the specifically linguistic constraints which determine polyphonic interpretation. Our hope is that this insistence on a formal anchoring may enable us to develop *ScaPoLine* into a heuristic apparatus that makes possible operational analyses, not merely of individual utterances, but also of fragments of text composed of several utterances. In *ScaPoLine* we do not speak of utterers (*énonciateurs*): the « voices », or rather the points of view, are directly associated with *discourse entities* (DEs for short), a term central to this theory. The DEs are conceived as images of the « persons » who are created by the speaker and the “persons” who inhabit the discourse. In this article I shall examine, by means of empirical analyses, the nature of the DEs such as they are conveyed by the utterances. This is an attempt to reach a better understanding of the role that is played by DEs in polyphonic interpretation. However, before proceeding, I must first run through the conceptual foundation and the set of central elements in *ScaPoLine*: its « framework ». This done, I shall define and analyze the different types of DE

for the purpose of drawing up an inventory of them. I shall then show that the speaker is capable of leaving more traces of his utterance activity than the simple creation of DEs with their points of view. The article will conclude with some reflections on the perspectives that are opened by this approach to linguistic polyphony.

## **1. The conceptual foundation**

The domain of the empirical studies of ScaPoLine is the polyphonic meaning of utterances ; that is to say the semantic description of the utterance that is given by the linguist. It is what we observe. Following Ducrot, we conceive of the utterance as an image of the act of utterance and its meaning thus relates to all the elements present at the moment of that act : the propositional content, the interlocutors, the situation of the utterance, and so on.

Our theoretical object of study is however the linguistic anchoring of the polyphonic meaning. Indeed, the point of departure for every theory of linguistic polyphony is the hypothesis that the utterances' polyphony leaves traces at the level of *langue*. Or in other words, that the *langue*, conceived, following Saussure, as the linguistic system, provides instructions for the polyphonic interpretation of *parole*. The challenge therefore is to delimit this linguistic dependence from the creation of linguistic polyphony: to what extent can the polyphonic meaning of a given utterance be attributed to its linguistic form? What are the expressions and the structures which carry the « polyphonic » instructions? To what degree is the linguistic form able to impose a polyphonic reading of utterances ?

It is known that meaning is never fully determined linguistically : multiple linguistic and extra-linguistic factors converge to create the meaning, and from there the interpretations. There is therefore every reason to think that polyphony is created by a combination, perhaps complex, of phenomena of which some derive from *langue*, others from the (situation of ) *parole*. This is why we have taken two important theoretical decisions : our general approach is modular and the process of actual interpretation is modeled.

### **1.1. The modular approach**

The modular approach makes use of a theoretical model composed of a certain number of autonomous sub-systems called modules, where each module is entrusted with a limited range of problems. A module may be conceived as a partial theory comprising a system of (local) rules with a specified domain of application. The different modules are connected

with the aid of a system of global rules, the meta-rules, which articulate their interaction<sup>21</sup>. The basic idea which underlies every modular approach is that the overall conception of what one is doing must never be lost from view. Ideally, the modular approach promotes concise descriptions of the phenomena because the limited number of concepts and rules in each module enables the formulation of precise definitions of the central notions. Further, it opens a way forward at the level of explication because it allows the detection of systematic relations between phenomena which have been defined independently one from another. ScaPoLine is to be understood as a module in a wider modular model.

### **1.2. The interpretation model**

Our ideal goal consists in explicating the detectable relations between the different linguistic forms and the interpretations which they give rise to, while concentrating here on the polyphonic aspects. To do this, I shall have recourse to a semantics, both instructional and of the utterance, combined to an interpretation model. In instructional semantics, the meaning encoded in *langue* comprises sets of instructions. Every linguistic expression, whether a morpheme, a word, a sentence or an encoded prosodic phenomenon, provides a set of instructions concerning its contribution to the interpretation of the utterance. Following Ducrot, the utterance is conceived as an image of the act of utterance and from that it follows that the coding is formed of traces of this act. One might say that the instructions pose constraints on the potential for interpretation. Moreover, they indicate an interpretation *by default*. That is to say, the instructions indicate a context by default which we might characterize as being « constructed » by the linguistic form. Taken together, the instructions generate the *signification*<sup>22</sup> which is an output of the modular model. The process of « actual » interpretation is then described in a four-stage interpretation model<sup>23</sup>. This model does not have a place in the linguistic theory strictly speaking, but it allows us to situate it and its results in a more general framework.

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<sup>21</sup> To get such a model to work and avoid the risk of falling into the trap of blind eclecticism, the modular approach must obey a certain number of methodological principles. For a more thorough introduction to the modular approach, see Nølke (1994 ; 1999).

<sup>22</sup> I here adopt the terminology proposed by Ducrot, where the *signification* is the semantic description which the linguist gives of an expression of *langue* while the *meaning* denotes the description which he associates with it at the level of *parole*.

<sup>23</sup> Let us emphasise that no cognitive postulate will be attached to this model whose goal is solely to allow us to place our results in a wider scientific framework. Nonetheless the model is capable of generation testable cognitive hypotheses.

### Interpretation model

The **instructions** :

- Set out the typical variables (that is to say the variables associated with the restricted domains)
- Set out the relations between the variables
- Give indications respecting their engagement (able to activate certain laws of discourse in a systematic way)

The **co(n)text** allows the saturation of variables which, itself, forms part of the interpretation

The **interpretative strategies** control the saturation and, hence, the interpretation (within the limits permitted by the instructions laid out by the signification)

The **interpretation framework** : scenarios, genres, ...

By context, I understand the textual context (the cotext) no less than the utterance situation, the spatio-temporal context, the reciprocal expectations and encyclopedic context. As for the interpretative strategies, it could be Grice's maxims that are involved, the principle of relevance or a good number of other strategies which guide our research of elements able to saturate the variables or to add other aspects of interpretation. The interpretation framework, finally, also gives instructions for the interpretation, these however of a quite different character. The study of the instructions alone, the initial stage, belongs to the linguistics of *langue*.

#### **1.3. The ideal discourse**

As the image of the utterance act, the utterance contains indications concerning its protagonists, the utterance situation, etc. All these indications lend themselves to encoding, which thus makes it the object of our domain of theoretical study. The empirical challenge is therefore to delimit this linguistic dependence from the observed polyphonic interpretation. It is a matter of finding operational tests to allow us to distinguish the aspect of the coded meanings (in the instructions) from the aspects of meaning deriving from other stages of the interpretation model. To this end, we may have recourse to the notion of the *ideal discourse*. The ideal discourse is the discourse which arises in the context by default of utterances. Every utterance sets up a restricted number of virtual links belonging to the ideal discourse which is associated with it. This idea allows us to make use of the linking test already proposed by Anscombe and Ducrot. Let us illustrate this test by means of the study of an example which has become canonic, that of the syntactic negative *ne...pas*.

Let us consider the two following utterances :

- (1) This wall is white.  
(implicit: someone thinks or might think : « this wall is not white »)
- (2) This wall is not white.  
(implicit : someone thinks or might think : « this wall is white »)

In the two utterances our intuition registers the presence of the implications indicated. Indeed, neither the utterance of (1) nor that of (2) would be relevant without this implication. It is in this sense that we will say that the two utterances are polyphonic: they convey a sort of crystallized dialogue. Now, the linking test reveals that these two implications do not have the same status:

- (3) a. – I know it is so.  
b. (...), which my neighbour is unhappy about.
- (4) a. – Why should it be like that?  
b. (...), which my neighbour believes to be the case.

We shall see that the anaphors of these links (*so*, *which* and *that*) do not function in the same way after (1) and after (2). Linking to (2), those in (3) relate to the content of the utterance, while those in (4) relate to the implications ; linking to (1), all the anaphors relate to the content of the utterance, although the links to (4) are still possible. The possibility for an anaphor to relate to an implication tells us that this implication is indicated at the level of *langue*. Since the only difference between the utterances (1) and (2) resides in the presence of the negative *ne...pas* in (2), it must be this negation which provides the instruction for the polyphonic reading of (2). We shall say that the negation is a marker of polyphony or that it encodes the polyphonic reading.

#### **1.4. The polyphonic structure and configuration**

A polyphonic reading may therefore either be indicated by instructions conveyed by the language, or just arise as the effect of meaning by an act of utterance as is the case with utterance (1). In order to distinguish clearly these two sources of polyphony, we introduce a terminological distinction :

A *polyphonic structure* is composed of the set of instructions which the language provides for the polyphonic interpretation of the utterances ;

A *polyphonic configuration* is the polyphonic meaning which the linguist associates with the utterance. The configuration forms part of the interpretation that the addressee makes of the text with which he is confronted.

Being a linguistic theory of *langue*, the object of the theoretical study of ScaPoLine is polyphonic structure. Now, having no direct access to *langue*, we must first study configuration which is all that we are able to observe : it is our empirical domain.

## 2. The framework of ScaPoLine

It is an axiom of the theory that every utterance has a speaker. By extension, a text, composed of utterances, is conceived as the product of the discourse : it is a « frozen » image of the discourse created by the speaker<sup>24</sup>. It is the speaker who guarantees that the text is anchored in the social world. It is a particular image of the speaking (or writing) subject. One can say that it is a mask worn by the man as he speaks or writes. This construction of the speaker as source of the text is probably more or less unconscious in daily life, where the mask tends to be adapted to the particular situation of discourse : someone does not construct himself to be the same speaker whether he is addressing his boss or his children. One would imagine that this construction is far more deliberate and sophisticated in literary texts where the physical author often gives much attention to constructing the speaker : the author of the text. Interesting as the study of this relation between the speaking subject and the speaker may be, it goes beyond the scope of ScaPoLine.

Now, it is a component feature of language to allow – in its employment – the presence of traces of the actual activity of the speaker. This property is doubtless explained by the inherent dialogic nature of language. These traces constitute the only access we have to the characteristics of the speaker. Thus the speaker is able to construct several types of images of himself, or rather a variety of roles which he is able, with his utterances, to play. We shall distinguish two principal types : LOC, which is an image of the speaker in his role

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<sup>24</sup> The text also forms a component part of the discourse : it both creates and reflects it..

as constructor of the utterance (and, therefore, of its meaning, cf §4), and different images of himself as a source of points of view (cf §3).

It is thus LOC which constructs the polyphonic configuration of which he is himself part. According to ScaPoLine, the configuration is composed of four basic elements :

The **speaker as constructor (LOC)** assumes responsibility for the utterance.

The **points of view (POV's)** are the semantic entities which carry a source which is said to have the POV. The sources are variables. They correspond to the utterers (*énonciateurs*) of Anscombre and Ducrot. The general form of a POV is : **[X] ( JUDGE ( p ) )**, where *[X]* indicates the source, and *JUDGE* a judgement which the source makes on the content *p*.

The **discourse entities (DEs)** are the semantic entities which are able to saturate the sources.

The **utterance links (links)** connect the DEs to the POV's. They are of three types : the link of responsibility, the link of refutation, and the links of non-responsibility and of non-refutation of which there is a whole range. The DE which is source of a given POV adopts a link of responsibility for that POV<sup>25</sup>.

The four elements of the configuration may all be encoded in language, and thereby form part of the polyphonic structure, but this is not inevitable.

### 3. The discourse entities (DEs)

Let us emphasize from the start that according to the ScaPoLine definition LOC is not a DE although it is an entity of the discourse to the extent that, being an image of the speaker, it only exists in the discourse. The DEs are defined by their ability to saturate the sources of the POV's. LOC constructs them as images of the various « persons » who people the discourse. Three persons need to be distinguished. The first and second persons form an inherent part of the discourse and the third may be introduced explicitly by different linguistic expressions, especially by nominal groups, pronouns or proper names. LOC constructs images of the three persons in its own manner. It constructs them through the POV's which it associates with them. The following example is revealing in this regard:

(5)            Tell me what I've eaten this morning since you know everything.

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<sup>25</sup> For a more substantial description of POV's and links, see for example Nølke (2008). In the present article I am focusing on DEs.



Oswald Ducrot has shown that the specific function of the connector *since* is to present the contents of the subordinate clause which it introduces as having responsibility taken for them by the addressee in the default reading (Ducrot 1983)<sup>26</sup>. In our terminology, that comes down to saying that LOC constructs an image of his addressee according to which he thinks that he knows everything. It is clear that in a normal situation the addressee does not agree with this, and he knows that the speaker does not expect him to either. The heavy irony which the utterance of (5) tends to produce derives from this game. The example illustrates that LOC is in absolute control of the construction of images of his interlocutors as well as all the other persons which he brings into his discourse, himself included. Let us now proceed to some empirical analyses in order to come to a better understanding of the nature of the DEs as they are conveyed by utterances.

### **3.1. The first person / speaker**

As a general rule the speaker constructs in every one of his utterances images of himself as a DE. There is a rule that, other things being equal, LOC always constructs at least one POV for which the speaker-DE takes responsibility. This rule is only infringed in the case of irony where LOC adopts a POV from which he distances himself. But it is known that for irony to work, there must be something in the situation, gestures for example or special knowledge, which makes apparent that the POV (the principal one) is not the speaker's. We have already seen an example in (2), repeated here for convenience :

- (2)        This wall is not white.  
            POV<sub>1</sub>: 'this wall is white'  
            POV<sub>2</sub>: POV<sub>1</sub> is false

The instructions indicate that it is the speaker (as DE) who is the source of POV<sub>2</sub>, while they convey no information as to the source of POV<sub>1</sub>. This « hole » in the polyphonic structure activates the search for a source at the interpretation stage : we tend to seek out the person who could think – according to the speaker – that the said wall might be white, but nothing prevents us from understanding the utterance even if our search is vain.

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<sup>26</sup> For a ScaPoLine analysis of *since* (*puisque*), see Nølke & Olsen (2002).

Let us notice in passing that polyphonic structures « holed » in this way are widespread. Certain linguistic expressions may even be chosen to present POV's for which the source is not indicated. Here are two more examples :

- (6) It appears that the minister is unwell.
- (7) The minister is reportedly unwell. (« journalistic »)

In the two examples, the only indication of the source of POV 'the minister is unwell' is that it is not the speaker. The POV of the speaker consists in his distancing himself<sup>27</sup>.

The LOC is capable of constructing different types of images of himself. Oswald Ducrot (1984 : 199&fol.) has already shown in his analysis of the expression some opinions which persuaded him to introduce a distinction between the « speaker-as-speaker » who only has life within the utterance where he appears and the « speaker as an entity of the world » who is a « complete » person. The analysis of the presupposition illustrates this splitting of the speaker. Drawing inspiration from the notion of the ONE-truth<sup>28</sup> of Berrendonner (1981), Ducrot has proposed an analysis of the presupposition according to which this is about the NO (or VOX PUBLICA) :

- (8) Paul has stopped smoking.  
POV<sub>1</sub>: 'Paul used to smoke' (presupposition, for which NO takes responsibility)  
POV<sub>2</sub>: 'Paul no longer smokes' (asserted, speaker taking responsibility)

It is evident that the speaker is included in this NO. Now, here it is a question of the speaker as an entity of the world, while it is the speaker-as-speaker who assumes responsibility for the assertion.

This (second) distinction inside the concept of the speaker proves to be very important for empirical analyses, and in ScaPoLine we take it up in a modified and developed form. Thus we distinguish the following images of the speaker :

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<sup>27</sup> More delicate polyphonic analyses of the two utterances reveal that this distancing does not operate in exactly the same way in both cases. For *it appears that*, see Nølke (2001 : 15-24) and for the conditional, see Kronning (2005).

<sup>28</sup> Here, and in the rest of the article ONE is a translation of the French word *on* meaning all relevant persons.

**The textual speaker, S**, is the source of a POV which the speaker held before his act of utterance and which he still holds. S is presented as having all the features of a complete person. The LOC can thus construct a general image of the speaker or an image of him at another point in his history.

**The speaker of the utterance, s<sub>0</sub>**, is the source of a POV which the speaker holds here and now, but which he does not necessarily hold either before or after. The peculiarity of l<sub>0</sub> is to exist only in the particular act of utterance, U<sub>0</sub>.

**The utterance speaker, s<sub>t</sub>**, is the source of a POV that the speaker had at the moment t (≠ 0) when he constructed the act of utterance, U<sub>t</sub>.

In virtue of a principle of polyphonic coherence, the speaker keeps his points of view unless there is an explicit indication to the contrary as the (monologic) text progresses. That is the same thing as saying that a POV of s<sub>t</sub> is capable of being converted into a POV of S.

It will be seen that s<sub>t</sub> is an s<sub>0</sub> of the past (or of the future). Just like s<sub>0</sub>, s<sub>t</sub> has existence only in the particular act of utterance (U<sub>t</sub>), its sole property being to take responsibility for U<sub>t</sub>. All previous existence is existence retrieved. If we keep the two images of the speaker separate, it is because s<sub>0</sub> plays a role that is altogether peculiar. Existing only in the act of utterance here and now, it enters into a quite narrow relation with the LOC, which has certain consequences for the construction of the act of utterance. Thus a rule may be postulated according to which l<sub>0</sub> is always<sup>29</sup> source of the POV that is the highest one in a hierarchical structure of POV's. We have already seen in the analysis of negation, where l<sub>0</sub> is source of POV<sub>2</sub> which bears on POV<sub>1</sub>. The adverbs of the utterance give us other examples of it. Thus in :

(9) Perhaps Pierre has come back.

s<sub>0</sub> is the source of the POV '*perhaps p*', while another DE is the source of the POV '*p*' (in the reading by default, it is S, cf Nølke 1993 : 174). A corollary difference between s<sub>t</sub> and s<sub>0</sub> is that while the POV's of the latter can be shown (in Wittgenstein's sense 1961 : §4.022 & fol. <sup>30</sup>), as is the case in the given example, the POV's of the former can only be said (or recounted), as in :

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<sup>29</sup> More precisely as a very strong default value.

<sup>30</sup> According to Wittgenstein, whatever is said is fit for consideration in terms of its truth (or falsity), while what is merely shown should not be subject to discussion.

(10) I certainly said that I would come back.

where the POV *I will come back* is retrieved.

REMARK: Direct speech represented (DSR) constitutes an exception to this « rule » (*I certainly said* : « *I will come back* »). In the DSR, the LOC represents the act of utterance of another, who may himself be at a different time, with all his utterance coordinates. It is a question of a *Represented Speaker* (shortened to RS) constructed as an *imitated LOC*. In represented indirect speech (ex (10)), including the free indirect style, RS is constructed as a « normal » DE, cf Nølke (2006).

The presupposition is not the only element whose analysis necessitates the distinction. There are indeed numerous linguistic expressions which indicate the presence of several images of the speaker. We have just seen that (9) is an example in the default reading. A more interesting example perhaps is the modality *It seems that* which, unlike the modalities conveyed by phrasal adverbs, is said<sup>9</sup>. Elsewhere I have proposed the following analysis of this modality (Nølke 2001 : 23)<sup>31</sup> :

(11) It seems that (p)

POV<sub>1</sub>: [ X ] ( TRUE (p) )

POV<sub>2</sub>: [ I<sub>0</sub> ] ( SEEM (POV<sub>1</sub>) )

X = S by default (fairly strong value)

SEEM means:

POV<sub>1</sub> rests on a certain number of indices which do not lend themselves to explication.

It will be noticed that, in the default reading, which is almost obligatory, *it seems that* introduces a sort of internalized discourse. Let us take a simple example to illustrate the analysis :

(12) It seems that Marie is unwell

The fact that the speaker of the utterance assumes the responsibility for the internalized discourse (POV<sub>2</sub>) entails that this discourse takes place at the moment of speaking. This analysis will be corroborated by a study of the distribution of *it seems that p* (Nølke 2001: 28 & fol.). It follows also from the fact that L is associated by default with POV<sub>1</sub> that s<sub>0</sub>

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<sup>31</sup> I take up and rephrase here the study of *It seems that* presented in Nølke (2001 : 15-34).

matches this point of view. Another consequence is that the speaker is able to link into this point of view in his continuous discourse. Witness:

(13) It seems that Marie is unwell. So we won't be able to count on her to help us.

The modality *it seems that* is especially interesting in that it may be able to indicate past time from the fact that it includes a verb form :

(14) It seemed that Marie was unwell.

In this case,  $s_0$  cannot be held responsible for  $POV_2$ , for it exists only at the moment of speaking. Nonetheless, everything suggests that the analysis is fundamentally valid even in this case, for there is the clear impression that the utterance of (14) too introduces an internalized discourse. Taking into account examples with a verb in the past leads me therefore to modify somewhat the analysis proposed in (11). It is however sufficient to replace  $s_0$  by  $s_t$ , for the analysis of *It seems that* thus to become yet another argument in favour of the introduction of utterance speakers.

### 3.2. The addressee<sup>32</sup>

The distinction introduced between the textual speaker and the utterance speaker applies to the two other persons. Thus, in the example already considered:

(5) Tell me what I have eaten this morning since you know everything.

it is the textual addressee who is the source of the POV introduced by *since*, and in utterance (15) :

(15) You told me that you would come back.

It is the utterance addressee who is the source of the POV of the subordinate clause. In Nølke, Fløttum & Norén (2004), we have argued in favour of an addressee *of the utterance*, that is to say an  $a_0$ . We propose the hypothesis by which  $a_0$  (like  $s_0$ ) is found in the MODUS. According to this hypothesis, we would have a trace of  $a_0$  in an utterance like (16) :

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<sup>32</sup> The addressee is the second person, the one to whom the utterance is directed, according, as ever, to the semantics of the utterance.

- (16) but, **you know**, it's not very mysterious, the transition from manuscript to typescript..  
(Nølke *et al.* 2004 : 121)

We had thus associated the concept of the utterance DE to that of showing. Every DE indicated in a segment whose meaning is shown would be an utterance entity. It seems to me today that we were mistaken. Indeed, the expression *you know* is hardly adequate to introduce a POV in the strict sense in (16). If it has shown meaning, it is precisely because it serves more as an interactional function. Now, even if its meaning is taken literally, this expression can hardly indicate the presence of  $a_0$ . Thus, if the *you know* does indeed have shown meaning, it is the LOC who, as constructor, has chosen to show that the POV 'it's not very mysterious' forms part of the knowledge of its addressee. But then, it is only a textual entity that can be associated to knowledge, which, by its very nature, transcends the moment of speaking.

We can conclude that two images of the addressee exist:

**The textual addressee,  $A$** , is the source of a POV the addressee held before the act of utterance and which he still holds.  $A$  is presented as having all the features of a complete person. LOC can thus construct a general image of the addressee or an image of him at another point in his history.

**The utterance addressee,  $a_t$** , is the source of a POV that the speaker had at the moment  $t$  ( $\neq 0$ ) when he constructed the act of utterance  $U_t$ .

To end let us note that it is relatively rare that the addressee leaves traces in the linguistic form. On the other hand, his images often appear at the level of the utterance as a default value of the variables whose linguistic form gives no instruction relative to their saturation. Thus, if one says to someone « This wall is not white », the interlocutor tends to think that it is he who, according to the speaker, is the source of the positive POV.

### **3.3. Third parties**

The third parties are the DEs who can be represented by third person pronouns, by proper names or by nominal syntagmata. As for the two first persons, we distinguish the textual

third parties, T, from the utterance third parties,  $\tau_t$  ( $t \neq 0$ ). Third parties require a second subdivision : that between individual and collective third parties. The LOC is actually able to construct POV's for which collective parties are held responsible. It is for example the case with presupposed POV's of which we have already seen an example ((8)). Individual third parties correspond to DEs of the first and second person and the distinction between textual DEs and utterance DEs is only relevant for this category<sup>33</sup>. Let us therefore concentrate our attention on collective third parties.

For ScaPoLine, collective third parties are distributed along a scale running from heterogeneous collectives, where the individual members are distinguished in principle, to homogenous collectives which are DEs taken as collectivities with vague outlines, such as the LAW, the *doxa*, received ideas, eternal truths. What distinguishes the heterogeneous from the homogenous is that the former are divisible into several « voices » while the latter are indivisible. In certain cases, the typical collective third party is not made explicit in the instructions. The LAW, for example, can be given as the source of a general idea conveyed by a POV whose semantic content is presupposed. In an utterance such as (17):

(17) Pierre incorrectly believes that Jules is unwell.

the POV 'Jules is not unwell' holds an utterance link of responsibility with the LAW. However, everything depends on the particular utterance situation and the interpretation. It is easy to imagine a situation where this presupposition, denoting a state that is not general and is indeed fairly specific, should rather be attributed to a heterogeneous third party collective, a type that we shall symbolize by NO (polyphonic).

The homogenous third parties never seem to be indicated without ambiguity in the polyphonic structure and it follows from this that it is difficult to find formal tests to detect them. It is not the same with heterogeneous ones, where one can apply some ideas borrowed from Anscombe's (p.ex. 2005) theory of stereotypes. These tests even allow us to identify several types of heterogeneous third parties. Indeed, it proves pertinent for us to distinguish the cases where S, A or Ts enter or do not enter into heterogeneous third parties. We shall symbolize these scenarios by  $NO_{+L}$ ,  $NO_{-L}$ ,  $NO_{+A}$ , etc., symbols which combine together. Thus  $NO_{+L,-A}$  proves pertinent for a certain type of presupposition (cf *infra*). Anscombe proposes to apply certain markers called mediatory: the **M.D.S.**, to detect

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<sup>33</sup> Coco Norén has already argued in favour of this distinction back in 2007 (*in* : Fløttum *et al.* 2007 : 135).

the presence of different « NO-speakers », a concept which corresponds to our NOs. In terms of ScaPoLine, the M.D.S. are expressions which the LOC makes use of to identify the sources of POV's which he constructs. Thus, in the examples (23)-(26) from Anscombe (2005: 84) renumbered here:

- (18) It is a well-known fact that monkeys eat bananas.
- (19) It is a well-known fact that I was ill last year.
- (20) It is a well-known fact that our present government is right-wing.
- (21) It is a well-known fact that Europe will come together one day or another.

The M.D.S. *it is a well-known fact that* brings the instruction according to which it is a collective third party that assumes responsibility for the POV expressed in the subordinate clause. As Anscombe shows, S is an obligatory part of this POV :

- (22) \*It is a well-known fact that Europe is in the process of coming together, but in my opinion it never will..  
(The asterisk here is due to Anscombe)

If this utterance is compared with (23)

- (23) People say that Europe is in the process of coming together, but in my opinion, it never will.

it will be seen that it is the presence of the particular M.D.S. which is the cause of this obligatory presence of L. The utterance of (23), just like that of (22), communicates a POV having NO as source, but it is a question of two different variants of this NO : NO<sub>+s</sub> and NO<sub>-s</sub> respectively. Do the tests proposed by Anscombe in the framework of his theory of stereotypes suggest that this distinction created in the interior of the polyphonic NOs between ON<sub>+s</sub> and ON<sub>-s</sub> is perhaps more important than that between heterogeneous and homogenous third parties? Indeed, while it is difficult to find tests which clearly separate the heterogeneous from the homogenous, the types of NO are indicated linguistically.

There is every reason to suppose that more could be done to refine the typology of the heterogeneous third parties. I have shown elsewhere (Nølke 1983: 33) that it is important to distinguish strong presuppositions and weak presuppositions. A strong presupposition, PP, is characterized by the fact that « the speaker supposes that the interlocutor believes



that PP is true », while for a weak presupposition, pp, « the speaker believes[only] that the interlocutor does not think that pp is false ». It will be seen that in polyphonic terms, this distinction corresponds to saying that PP is associated with  $ON_{+S+A}$ , while it is  $ON_{+S-A}$  that assumes responsibility for pp. The paradigmaticizing adverbs *even* and *especially* may serve as M.D.Ss. here. These adverbs always introduce a presupposition according to which other elements of the same paradigm could replace the element actually presented without a change in the truth value<sup>34</sup>. Thus the utterances of (24) and (25):

(24) Even Pierre ate some cakes.

(25) Pierre especially ate some cakes.

communicate the information that other people also ate some cakes. But this presupposition is strong in the case of *even*, while it is weak in the case of *especially*. This is the reason why the presupposition of *especially* is able to convey new information, which is not possible for that of *even*:

(26) A: Who does the cleaning?

B: a. ☹ Even Pierre does some..

b. ☺ Pierre especially does some.

Consequently in the following utterances:

(27) Even the industrialized countries have profoundly altered their attitude.

(28) The industrialized countries, especially, have profoundly altered their attitude.

responsible for POV ('the industrialized countries have profoundly altered their attitude') is  $NO_{+S+A}$  in (16), but perhaps  $NO_{+S-A}$  in (17).

This leads us then to the following classification of third parties

Individual third parties :  $T, \tau_t (t \neq 0)$

Collective third parties :

- Heterogeneous third parties

$NO_{+S,+A}$

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<sup>34</sup> For a syntactic and semantic analysis of paradigmaticizing adverbs, such as *even* and *especially*, see Nølke (1983).

NO<sub>+S,-A</sub>

NO<sub>-S,+A</sub>

NO<sub>-S,-A</sub>(??)

- Homogenous third parties (LAW, received ideas, ...)

We find type a. in strong presuppositions, type b. in weak presuppositions and type c. in certain utterance themes for which S is able to escape the responsibility. The existence of type d. is unproven. The proof remains an empirical question.

### 3.4. Types of polyphony

We shall distinguish **external polyphony** from **internal polyphony** according to the presence or absence of DEs other than the speaker's images<sup>35</sup> :

(5) Tell me what I ate this morning since you know everything.

(29) It seems to me that Marie is ill.

(9) It could be that Pierre has come back.

We have external polyphony in (5) and internal polyphony in (29). In (9), we have internal polyphony in the interpretation by default, but if the utterance is integrated in a concessive structure we come back to external polyphony :

(30) Maybe Pierre has come back, but I haven't seen him.

In (30) the POV 'Pierre has come back' is conceded. It is therefore presented as originating with another DE.

The two types of polyphony are not mutually exclusive. Once the utterance conveys a POV for which NO<sub>+L</sub> is the source (as is the case with presuppositions), we shall have internal and external polyphony both at the same time, for NO<sub>+L</sub> combines L (the reason for internal polyphony) with the DEs in the second or third person (the reason for external polyphony). In utterances (5) and (29) cited above, we have however a polyphony that is external or internal *in the strict sense*. The existence of these types of polyphony thus allows us to refine our empirical analyses.

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<sup>35</sup> This distinction is introduced in Nølke (1985) for the analysis of the subjunctive mode. Subsequently, it has proved important for the description of a wide range of phenomena.

#### 4. LOC

If the only linguistic trace of the speaker in his role as constructor had been the simple product of his construction – the text as text – we would have had no need to introduce LOC. However, it transpires that, in constructing, the speaker is also able to construct individual traces of his action. This is notably so because the LOC is placed at the deictic centre of the utterance. From this it follows that deictic expressions refer back to the LOC. The following utterances give other examples of its overt presence:

(31) Pierre said that he would come back.

(32) Frankly, Pierre is stupid.

In (31), the conditional mood functions as a future in the past. We shall see that the future is that of Pierre, but the past is that of the LOC. Indeed, the discourse reported took place in the past relative to the moment when the LOC constructed his utterance. In (32), the speaker supplies a commentary to his own construction in qualifying his utterance as frank. It is rather like the author of a play who drafts stage directions. To enter the study of traces of the LOC in any depth would however go beyond the limits of the present article<sup>36</sup>.

#### 5. Perspectives: interdisciplinary projects

In this article, I have concentrated on one particular aspect of ScaPoLine : the nature of discourse entities. My analyses have all been within the framework of the linguistics of *langue*. The construction of DEs as images of discourse referents does however open the perspective of interdisciplinary studies. We have already seen ourselves obliged to enlarge the Saussurian concept of *langue* by introducing the notion of an idealized discourse which is the discourse constructed by linguistic form. Since then, the step from an idealized discourse to an authentic one has seemed achievable. It would imply the passage from a linguistic anchoring to an extra-linguistic one, with reference as intermediary. The DEs would become the images of flesh-and-blood beings. We would no longer be in the domain

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<sup>36</sup> For analyses of traces of LOC, see Jønsson (2004) or Nølke (2009).

of the linguistics of *langue* but would have crossed the frontiers of pragmatics, socio-linguistics or of psycho-linguistics – or of literary studies (!). Why not dare to take this step? It would require a significant development in methodology, granted, but there is every reason to believe that such an inter- or trans-disciplinary project would yield fruits to repay such work in ample fashion. Socio-linguists, psycho-linguists, literary specialists could all apply our linguistic analyses in order to refine their own ones, and we, the linguists, could in turn profit from their interpretations of text and discourse, thus escaping the task of ourselves having to construct our own materials, our observable data.

Polyphony is everywhere. Could there be a finer theme to lay the foundation of a serious, honest collaboration between the human sciences?

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## Shakespeare's Dialogic Imagination

Michael Skovmand

The title refers to the famous collection of four seminal essays by Mikhail Bakhtin called 'The Dialogic Imagination', edited by Michael Holquist, from 1975. This article is in large part inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic, in this work and throughout his work.

My aim is not to perform an in-depth analysis of the meaning of Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic. This would, among many other aspects, require a thorough grounding in the Russian language – and it has been done by others, notably Tzvetan Todorov and Michael Holquist. My aim is to use the concept of the dialogic as a heuristic concept –i.e. as a search model which elicits significant patterns and structures. Nevertheless, it is necessary to start out with a basic analysis of how, and against what the concept is defined.

Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic contrasts with what he calls the 'monologic': the authoritative, closed discourse, often implicitly associated with the dictatorial discourse of the Communist system. The primary literary dialogic genre, to Bakhtin, was the novel, more specifically the 19<sup>th</sup> C novel of particularly Dostoevskij and Dickens. Particularly the free indirect discourse of the novel was, to Bakhtin, a dialogic type of communication, with voices and positions co-existing simultaneously

Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic was also polemically oriented against the concept of 'the dialectic', both in the Hegelian form and in the form of the Communist idea of 'dialectical materialism', in which opposing dialectical positions are 'raised' to a synthesis – in Communist doctrine the classless society. In dialogic relations, different positions are not 'raised', but coexist both conflictually and fruitfully, without one cancelling out the other(s).

The term dialogic overlaps with such terms as polyphony, heteroglossia, and double-or multivoicedness. My use of the term includes all of those aspects, just as Bakhtin tends to use the term 'dialogic' as a cover-all for all of these terms.

Applying the term 'dialogic' to the theatre in general, and to Shakespeare in particular, is inherently problematic, in that Bakhtin did not see the genre of drama as dialogic. He saw it as essentially monologic, and dominated by what he called 'the voice of the hero'. He,

similarly, saw the lyric and the epic as monologic genres. (This discussion is amply covered in *Shakespeare and Carnival After Bakhtin*, pp. 1-10) Bakhtin-inspired Shakespeare criticism generally dismisses Bakhtin's view of drama as a genre, seeing it as a consequence of Bakhtin's overly enthusiastic championing of the genre of the novel as the only truly dialogic literary genre.

In the following I shall apply the term dialogic to various levels of analysis: from macro analysis of Elizabethan society, to the architecture and dramaturgy of the open-air Elizabethan/Jacobean theatre, to Shakespeare's play with genre, and to specific linguistic and dramatic features of Shakespeare's plays.

## Historical Dialogics

It is a well-worn cliché, but nevertheless true to say that Shakespeare lived in a time of transition – between the disappearing Late Middle Ages and the emerging Renaissance, sometimes called the Early Modern period. These contrasts and conflicts between old and new pervaded every level and aspect of 16<sup>th</sup> century Britain and it is my contention that this dialogic provided much of the dynamism and complexity of Shakespeare's plays and poems.


The dialogic of the Middle Ages vs. the Renaissance is shaped by the contrasts and conflicts between a largely static feudal society on the one hand, and on the other hand an emerging mercantile, entrepreneurial society. Feudal society was dominated by guilds and estates. The church and the aristocracy were the dominant power positions, and craftsmen and artisans were restricted by stringent controls by the guilds. Shakespeare himself is a case in point. His move as a young man from Stratford to London around 1590 was effectively a move from the feudal society of small-town Stratford to the early modern society of the largest city of the Western world, a city of about 250.000 inhabitants. Here Shakespeare became part of a first generation of entrepreneur playwrights – writers who no longer dependent on the patronage of the aristocracy (although the political protection of the aristocracy was still necessary, hence the names of the theatrical companies: 'The Lord Chamberlain's Men', 'Lord Pembroke's Men' etc). In other words, a dialogic between patronage and entrepreneurship existed, not least because the theatre as a public form of communication had to be sensitive to the watchfulness of the powers that be, i.e. the City of London and the royal court.

The local versus the national/international, family obligations versus individual desire, honour versus expediency, feudal duties versus individual ambition, all of these themes resonate throughout Shakespeare's plays, and are a fleshing out of the transitional dialogic between the late medieval and early modern times.

## Theatrical dialogics

In the fourth quarter of the sixteenth century a new theatrical phenomenon established itself in London: the open-air public theatre. Until then there had been primarily three types of theatre: the plays put on in the halls of the aristocracy, often by more or less gifted servants ( as seen in e.g. *A Midsummer Night's Dream*) ; travelling troupes of players (such as those referred to in *Hamlet*) , and finally the largely religious plays enacted in connection with recurring seasonal or religious festivities. The first public open air permanent theatre was established in 1576 (some scholars argue about ten years earlier), and over the next decades dozens of such theatres opened in London. The theatres were supplemented by more exclusive indoor theatres, but the open-air theatres dominated until 1642, when they were closed down by Cromwell and the Puritans. The open-air theatre may have lasted for only 66 years, but as the world's first public, secular, professional and commercial theatre it fostered a generation of exceptional playwrights whose plays to this very day continue to be successfully performed. Why did this happen at this point in time, and in London? London had doubled in size over just a few decades, and it was a relatively young new generation of Londoners with a need for entertainment. Permanent theatres tapped into this need. The earlier travelling troupes had only a small repertoire of plays, since they would have a new audience in the next town every two three days. Permanent theatres needed much more variety of material, and this in turn created the need for a professional group of playwrights, and professional, full-time actors. But it was a very specific kind of theatre which emerged in London during this period. I suggest that the *structure* of these theatres were instrumental in creating this golden age of British drama.

The new open-air theatre – round, or hexagonal or octagonal, clearly had the courtyard of the Medieval inn as a model... The courtyards of small town inns were the places where the travelling troupes of players would perform their plays. They would erect their portable, curtained scaffold stage at the back of such courtyard .The enclosure would provide a shield against the bustle of the town, and make it





possible to collect money from those in the courtyard. The galleries of the inn would provide seating for the more well-to-do, and there would be standing room for the rest.

The open-air theatre of Shakespeare and his generation is a happy marriage of the old courtyard inn theatricals and the early modern professional theatre. It was a theatre which, to first-generation Londoners, was strongly reminiscent of the theatre they knew from the small towns and villages they came from. The primary source of our knowledge about the open-air theatre, apart from archaeological evidence and the plays themselves, stems from a drawing of the Swan theatre on the South Bank, made by a visiting Dutchman in 1596, Johannes de Witt. As can be seen, the scaffold stage of the travelling troupes has been maintained as a platform open to the audience on three sides. The physical relations between the galleries and the standing room of the groundlings is maintained, with the cheap seats being closest to the stage (a principle which was reversed in the indoor theatres, which in turn became the model for the modern-day theatre – which in turn became the model for the cinema!)

According to deWitt, the Swan theatre would accommodate 3000 spectators, an astronomical figure, but if his estimate is anywhere near the truth, the atmosphere would have been closer to that of a football stadium than a modern-day theatre. The audience, unlike that of a modern-day theatre audience, where everyone is in the dark and turned towards a lit stage opening, could see one another, and what is more, the players could see their audience. There were plenty of distractions: people moving about, vendors selling drinks and food, even prostitutes trying to pick up customers. Accordingly, the playwrights, and the actors, had to work hard to catch and maintain the attention of the audience. In this environment, you did not create a complete illusion of a play-world, in which the audience as voyeurs would be looking in. Rather, you would have a semi-permeable fourth wall which might be broken down at any time, by way of audience addresses, prologues and epilogues, songs, and even dancing after the play. Shakespeare wrote his plays in *scenes*, not in acts - the division into acts happened after his death with the publication of the First Folio. This means that Shakespeare was aiming for a dialogic structure in the sequencing of scenes, between court and tavern, between upstairs and downstairs etc., which would make for continuous variation and contrast.

The performances were almost exclusively contemporary 'modern dress', with few, if any specific period props. It is interesting to note that all of Shakespeare's plays are set abroad or in the past – an exoticism which makes for an interesting dialogue with modern dress. Considering how many of Shakespeare's plays dealt with the killing of monarchs, there was every reason for him to create a safe distance to contemporary England. And yet the use of modern dress signals both the universality of the play and its contemporary relevance.

### **Genre dialogics**

In the collected edition of Shakespeare's plays, *The First Folio* published in 1623, seven years after Shakespeare's death, his plays (or rather 36 of them) are neatly divided into comedies, histories and tragedies. But this neatness is deceptive. For one thing, it does not reflect the confusing array of titles applied to the plays in their earlier quarto versions. But, perhaps more interestingly, these divisions do not reflect the way in which Shakespeare throughout his career was constantly problematizing and deconstructing established notions of genre.

Shakespeare was criticized by 18<sup>th</sup> century purists, notably the magisterial Dr. Johnson, for mixing genres, and catering to popular taste, i.e. that of the groundlings. According to Dr. Johnson, Shakespeare could get away with it only because of his exceptional genius – but he should not be imitated. The Romantics stood this view on its head, claiming that it was precisely Shakespeare's ability to redefine and transcend genre limitations which marked his genius as a playwright. My argument would be a dialogic one: Shakespeare's exceptional ability as a playwright, genrewise, is to do with his ability to simultaneously inhabit and deconstruct existing genre conventions. Two examples will suffice:

*The Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet* was Shakespeare's first and only attempt at a romantic tragedy. The story was well-known as an Italian novella which had been translated into a long poem by Arthur Brooke in 1562. Shakespeare shortened the the time span of the storyline, made Juliet younger, and he introduced Mercutio as a foil character to Romeo. The scenario, however, has all the elements of a comedy: heavy parents, two young people who are barred from having each other, and comical sidekicks such as Mercutio and the nurse. So for the first two acts we witness a comedy, complete with servants and masters and upstairs and downstairs complications. There is nothing heroic about Romeo, the narcissistic lover, or Juliet, the inexperienced ingénue, and cynical Mercutio and the practical nurse are given plenty of comical playtime. The turning-point comes with the fatal

duel in act three, in which Mercutio is killed, and Tybalt is killed by Romeo in revenge. At the same time the chorus disappears from the play. As the American critic Susan Snyder has pointed out (*The Comic Matrix of Shakespeare's Tragedies*, Princeton 1979) *Romeo and Juliet* can be seen as a 'comedy gone wrong', and many critics have seen the play as flawed dramatically. Certainly Shakespeare must have realized that Mercutio had to be killed off for the tragedy to unfold properly. However, since the play is unquestionably one of Shakespeare's most successful and most frequently performed plays over more than 400 years, and although popularity is not a criterion of quality, one should at least pause to consider the reason for the extraordinary appeal of the play. I suggest that Shakespeare in this early tragedy was testing the dramatic principle of blending comic and tragic elements, leading to the perhaps more organic blending that we find in the major tragedies such as *Hamlet* and *King Lear*. The dialogic of the tragic and the comic in Shakespeare seems to hinge on two principles (1) the dramatic one that you need peaks and valleys in a play. Tragic effects need to be counterbalanced to be effective. (2) the principle of 'realism': life is not all tragic. The tragedy may take place upstairs, but downstairs life goes on more or less as usual. Shakespeare's sense of these two kinds of 'dialogic' overrode any principles about the 'purity of genre'.

Another example is Shakespeare's most famous play, *Hamlet*. Ostensibly a so-called 'revenge tragedy', modelled on the Roman tragedies of Seneca, and a genre very popular at the time (above all Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*), Shakespeare rewrote a story from Saxo about Amled, a cunning survivor, turning it into a philosophical play, in which the protagonist constantly questions his own role as avenger of his father's murder. Shakespeare has chosen a contemporary stereotype, Melancholy Man, a person characterised by mood swings and indecision, always dressed in black, as his main character, a kind of character ridiculed in the comedies (e.g. early Romeo, Jacques in *As You Like It*, and Orsino in *Twelfth Night*). In other words, Shakespeare's version of Hamlet as a protagonist is a deliberate 'casting against type' – he is an anti-hero trying desperately to live up to the role of hero. In this way, Shakespeare creates a dialogic between the genre expectations of the heroic and the complexity and self-reflexivity of early modern man. He does not turn the play into a satire on the genre, but he adds layers of complexity to the play, making it simultaneously a family melodrama, a philosophical investigation, and a bungled revenge tragedy in which (practically) everyone dies.

## Textual' dialogics

### *Three examples*

#### **1**

The 'mock death' scene in *Romeo and Juliet* : in IV,1, Juliet goes to see Friar Lawrence, desperate to avoid being forcibly married to Paris – in fact – and this is important in judging the apparent foolhardiness of Friar Lawrence's scheme – prepared to kill herself rather than marry Paris. The good friar gives her a vial containing a magic fluid which will induce the appearance of death for 42 hours, whereupon she will 'awake as from a pleasant sleep.' She will be buried and placed in the Capulet family vault (no autopsy, please), from which place Romeo will fetch her and take her to Mantua. As we all know, this goes terribly wrong –the Friar's messenger is delayed because of plague restrictions, Romeo's servant Balthasar reaches him with news of Juliet's death before the Friar's messenger – Romeo rushes back to Verona, kills Paris who attempts to stop him, breaks into the burial vault, finds an ostensibly dead Juliet, kills himself just before Juliet wakes up – whereupon of course she, finding Romeo dead beside her, kills herself.

The phase which, from my point of view, is interesting, is the action between Juliet's mock suicide and her real one. The distribution of knowledge is important in this: Only Friar Lawrence, the audience, and (the comatose) Juliet know that Juliet's death is 'staged' – the rest of the characters are ignorant of this, and consequently display the behaviour of grief appropriate of parents and servants. The situation seems to contain all the conventional ingredients of dramatic irony: a discrepancy in knowledge between two groups of characters, with the audience on a par, knowledge-wise, with the group of characters 'in the know'. The question then is: how should we, the audience, respond to the reactions of the group of characters not 'in the know', who are grieving for no reason? Act IV, sc.5 of RJ is the crucial last scene of Act IV – after that everything precipitates towards the tragic 'catastrophe'. Clearly we, the audience, are not supposed to laugh, and audiences generally do not. But the scene contains a degree of complexity which 21<sup>st</sup> century audiences are not used to. There is the incongruity between the parents' grief and our knowledge that Juliet is not dead at all. There is the sense that the cruel parents were served right for trying to force Juliet into an unwanted marriage. And there is the natural identification with grieving parents for regretting forcing their ambitions on their daughter

## 2

The second example is the most famous soliloquy in all of Shakespeare's plays: 'To be or not to be' soliloquy from *Hamlet*, typically acted and read as the spontaneous overflow of Hamlet's powerful feelings. The 'To be' speech is a parody of philosophizing. The phrase itself 'To be or not to be' is a recognized shorthand for the discipline of philosophy (cf. Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* sc. 1, l.12-13: Bid on kai me on farewell; Galen come:/Seeing, ubi desinit philosophus, ibi incipit medicus,). ('On kai me on' being Greek for 'being and not being' i.e. philosophy) The reason why the speech appears 'less personal', in marked contrast to eruptions such as 'O that this too, too solid flesh...' or 'O what a rogue and peasant slave am I', is the simple one that it is a different 'speech genre': it is an imitation of philosophical argument. There's a polyphonic interplay, what Bakhtin has called an 'internalized dialogization' between mock-philosophical discourse, the representation of the wavering moodiness of melancholy, and the individual agenda of the 'unheroic' self-consciousness of Hamlet, negotiating the heroic expectations of the protagonist of a revenge tragedy. This layered dialogic reading of the soliloquy historicises the text, rescuing it from the monological view of Hamlet as a *rive gauche* Sartrean intellectual in black.

## 3

Antonio needs to borrow some money from his old enemy, Shylock the Jewish moneylender, because all of his ships are away from Venice, and he wants help his friend Bassanio get married to Portia, a rich heiress.

The confrontation between Antonio and Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice* is dialogic not just in the dramatic sense, but also in the Bakhtinian sense: two competing discourses, set within a context of unspecified past antagonisms. The venom of Shylock is matched by the laid-back arrogance of Antonio, who, however, is in the unenviable and vulnerable position not only of having to stoop to borrowing money from his enemy, but to compromise on his principled aversion to interest-taking. Antonio's opening line in this confrontation is indicative of this complex power game taking place between the two characters – it is designed to put Shylock in his place:

Ant. Shylock, albeit I neither lend or borrow  
By taking nor by giving of excess,  
Yet to supply the ripe wants of my friend,

I'll break a custom...

(Act I, sc. 3, ll.56-59)

Shylock, savouring the vulnerability of his old enemy, is not prepared to let Antonio off the hook so easily. In his highly personalised idiom of hesitation, repetition, and feigned attempts at recollecting things that are crystal-clear in his mind, he is extracting the maximum pleasure from Antonio's discomfort:

[...] Well then, your bond, and let me see, - but hear you,

Me thoughts you said, you neither lend nor borrow

Upon advantage.

Ant. I do never use it.

Shy. When Jacob graz'd his uncle Laban's sheep...etc

(Act I, sc.3, ll.63-66)

Shylock begins a leisurely and rambling Old Testament analogy which, ostensibly makes a point about breeding and thrift as time-honoured Biblical qualities, linking these concepts to that of 'interest'. The primary - dialogic- function of Shylock's speech is not, however, in its semantic content. It is, rather, in its act of appropriating the right to speak, indeed to preach at Antonio. As Bakhtin puts it,

"Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated - overpopulated - with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process" (Holquist 1981:294)

As the English philosopher Paul Grice would have put it, Shylock in deliberate violation of 'the cooperative principle' of communication, more specifically, in violation of 'the maximum of quantity'.

The simmering mutual aggression and resentment make for a dialogue between Antonio and Shylock - with Bassanio refereeing the contest - which is constantly on the verge of running off the rails, with bad faith on both sides, and with both parties constantly grasping every opportunity to get at the other person's sensibilities, or throat. Shylock's choice of an

Old Testament analogy - a text shared by Jews and Christians - to make his case for the taking of interest, predictably incenses Antonio ( "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose..." ) , and Antonio's attempt to close the deal ("Well, Shylock, shall we be beholding to you?") affords Shylock yet another opportunity to push the advantage of his situation:

“...You call me misbeliever, cut-throat dog,  
And spet upon my Jewish gabardine,  
And all for use of that which is mine own.  
[...] What should I say to you? Should I not say  
“Hath a dog money? Is it possible  
A cur can lend three thousand ducats?...”  
(Act I, sc.3, ll. 106-08; ll.115-17)

Language, in this dramatic confrontation between Shylock and Antonio, is indeed a contested space, not just in terms of appropriating the right to speak, but also semantically, in the process of naming. The phenomenon at the core of this dispute - borrowing money at interest, is constantly re-named: Antonio: "I neither lend nor borrow/ By taking nor by giving of excess"; Shylock: "You neither lend nor borrow/Upon *advantage*"; Antonio: "And what of him? [Jacob] did he take *interest*?" Shylock: "In the Rialto you have rated me/ About my moneys and my *usances*;" Antonio: "...when did friendship take/A *breed for barren metal* of his friend?"

The semantic quibbling continues, now focusing on the terms 'kind' and 'kindness':

Shy " ... This is kind I offer.  
Bass This were kindness.  
Shy This kindness I will show ..."  
(Act I, sc. 3, ll138-39)

Whereupon Shylock explains the conditions attached to the loan, 'the merry bond' of a pound of flesh. J.L. Halio (Halio 1993) suggests that Shylock's use of 'kind' in "this is kind I offer" is unidiomatic, reflecting his status as an alien. John Russell Brown (Arden edition of MV) points to the double meaning of 'kind' as 'generous' and 'natural'. I would add, against Halio, and supplementing Brown, that Shylock's use of 'kind' makes a third kind of sense: as "payment in kind" , i.e. payment not in money but "in goods or natural produce" (COD).

This makes all the more sense, since it connects logically with the preceding lines, in which Shylock, masterfully, calms down Antonio, who, after Shylock's "You call'd me a dog" - speech, has risen to the bait, and stormed: "I am as like to call thee so again/To spet on thee again, to spurn thee too."

Shylock, playing Antonio like a yo-yo, now calms Antonio down, as he would a child:

Shy Why look you how you storm!

I would be friends with you, and have your love,

Forget the shames that you have stain'd me with,

Supply your present wants, and take no doit

Of usances for my moneys, and you'll not hear me, -

*This is kind I offer.* [My italics]

(Act I, sc.3, ll.133-38)

The word 'kind' is interpreted by Bassanio as 'generosity', but Shylock immediately picks up the word 'kindness' and imposes his definition on it: "*This kindness I will show you*" - and it is indeed payment 'in kind' that he is referring to - the pound of flesh. There may be even a further semantic layer involved: Shylock has just made the first of his two 'identity' speeches ("Hath a dog money?" (to be followed up in III, 1 by "I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes?")) The 'merry bond' may indeed signify that, however much he may be treated as a dog, he and Antonio are 'of a kind', belonging to the same species. Shylock's offer can thus be seen as a parodic version of Antonio's feudal notions of the taking of interest as being dishonourable among peers. Contrary to his earlier Old Testament analogy of interest as 'breeding', Shylock now suggests the opposite: interest as physical reduction- the carving out of human flesh. Shylock clearly reiterates Antonio's terms 'friendship' ("... when did friendship take a breed for barren metal of his friend?") in his phrase: "I extend this friendship,/ If he will take it, so - if not, adieu" And there is in fact a surprisingly quick inversion at the end of this act, when Antonio seems to be won over by Shylock's baited offer, or at least mollified, echoing Shylock's declension of kind/kindness: ("... there is much kindness in the Jew" ; "... The Hebrew will turn Christian, he grows kind.") It is now Bassanio, up until this point broker and mediator of the deal, who has second thoughts: "I like not fair terms, and a villain's mind."



The dynamics of this crucial scene between Shylock and Antonio, accordingly, hinge on two semantic negotiations: on the one hand, the idea of a concept, or a signified -the payment of interest- expressed through a whole range of shifting signifiers. On the other hand, the presence of one- compound - signifier: kind/kindness, which is given a whole range of semantic inflections. But these dynamics do not simply co-exist, they relate to one another dialogically. Language is “over-populated with the intentions of others”, always pre-empting or anticipating future answers. And “utterance” in Act I, scene 3 in *The Merchant of Venice* is dialogic in a very overt sense, in that the two main characters continuously negotiate, or struggle, both semantically and in terms of what contemporary linguistics would call “turn-taking”. The scene could almost be said to be dialogically overdetermined, in the sense that it is quite literally a negotiation over the conditions of a loan, with all the ideological implications involved in Venetian/ and by extension, Elizabethan borrowing and lending in the 1590's.

What Bakhtin calls the “internal dialogization” of discourse, in which the speaker echoes or imitates or redefines the phrases of others may take many forms, but these forms are always oriented towards an answer, in anticipation or rebuttal or negotiation or approval. In the scene between Shylock and Antonio this “answerability” of utterance is primarily between the two characters - although wider contexts of social, cultural and religious implications resonate throughout.

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